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The use of FPGAs in commercial systems is nowadays more than normalize due their great 
configurability. The possibility of achieving complex logic duties with the use of a unique 
device added to their intrinsic reusable capabilities, make these devices a high valuable choice 
for electronics designers. These values are not passing in vain in the space community that 
started using FPGAs for non critical systems ten years ago. However the use of configurable 
devices in harsh environments is not near as established as it is on commercials or industrial 
systems.  
 
Up to day, only the so called antifused technology FPGAs are qualified for radiation 
environments. These FPGA are guaranteed up to a reasonable level of radiation to operate as 
they will do without the effects of high energetic particles. However these FPGA have two 
main disadvantage when comparing with SRAM based ones; firstly and most important, these 
are One Time Programmable (OTP) devices that once they are programmed, is not possible to 
change their behavioral; also new generation re-configurable FPGA, as the ones from Xilinx, 
have really high value embedded modules as hard-processors, multipliers, memories and 
Digital Signal Processors (DSPs). Although Xilinx and other SRAM FPGAs manufactures 
had performed great efforts to mitigate the radiation on theirs devices, achieving Total 
Ionizing Dose (TID) and Single Even Latch-Up (SEL) immunity, Single Event Upsets (SEU) 
are still a failure point on SRAM configuration memories. 
 
The aim of this master’s thesis is to cover the lack of up to day technology resolving SEUs. 
The idea is to use a radiation tolerant reconfigurable device, and design systems to mitigate 
the effects of SEU, removing single points of failure. This master’s thesis proposes two 
different ways of achieving a Rad-Hard by design system using redundancy, along with other 
techniques, at two key levels. Firstly, a complete SoC protected with new XTMR (Triple 
Module Redundancy) for SEU mitigation, along with a self scrubber module used for 
avoiding cumulative errors in configuration memory, is presented. This module will take 
advance of typical non-volatile memories used in On-Board Computers (OBC) to allow in 
mission self reconfiguration without interfering in OBC to memory communications. The 
second proposal is a device level redundancy where the lack of immunity of each device is 
assumed by a distributed architecture where critical duties are always performed by at least 
three devices at a time.  
 
Therefore, one mitigation scheme is proposed at tow different levels. First approach uses logic 
redundancy inside one device to mitigate the effects of radiation, while the second approach 
takes advantage of a distributed device architecture to discard erroneous parts and assure the 
healthiness at a system level. 
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0 ACRONYMS 
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PCB Printed Circuit Board 
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P/L PayLoad 
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SEE Single Event Effects 
SEL Single Event Lath-up 
SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt 
SEU Single Event Upset 
SoC System on Chip 
S/S Sub-System 
S/W Software 
TBC To be confirmed 
TBD To be defines 
TC Telecommand 
TID Total Ionizing Dose 
TM Telemetry 
TTC Telemetry Tracking and Command. 
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter 
VHDL Very High Level Description Language 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The capacity and performance of FPGAs suitable for space flight have been increasing 
steadily for more than a decade. In reprogrammable devices the increase has been from tens 
of thousands to millions system gates. The application of FPGAs has moved from simple glue 
logic to complete subsystem platforms that combine several real time system functions on a 
single chip, even including embedded microprocessors and memories [TIG01], [CON99]. The 
potential for FPGA use in space is continuously increasing, opening up new application areas. 
The FPGAs are more commonly being used in critical applications and are replacing ASICs 
on a regular basis. 
 
The behavioral of electronics components may be altered under space radiation. There are 
several phenomena that will be described here after that may cause transient malfunctioning 
and also part’s failure. Even though new generation FPGAs has been manufactured with 
radiation tolerance, still memory configuration and logic registers are susceptible to Single 
Event Effects that may provoke errors on the functionality implemented. Prior to decide a 
mitigation technique to be applied to the design, it’s very important to analyze the 
requirements of the mission in which the FPGA system will be involved. If the FPGA is to be 
deployed on a space critical mission in harsh environment, the mitigation scheme should 
involve redundant FPGA with configuration management. In the other side, application such 
image capture where operating window is small, no mitigation scheme may be applied. In 
between these two opposite scenarios there are several mitigations schemes that may fulfill 
our mission requirements. The following chart shows an overview for mitigation scheme 




Figure 1: Mitigation Scheme Matrix proposed by Xilinx. 
 
Mitigation techniques are being applied already to duplicate and triplicate the hardware 
modules (TMR), in order to be able to detect and correct this error on real time. However also 
configuration memory must be treated in order to avoid cumulative SEU in it, invalidating the 
other mitigation techniques. As will be described here after, memory configuration may be 
readback and compare with original from an external ROM. If any error is found, then it is 
possible to re-write the bitstream into the configuration memory without halting the FPGA 
running process. When doing this continuously and cyclically it is called scrubbing [CAR00].    
Thus when designing electronics systems to run at space level, several considerations must be 
taken into account in order to assure its own healthiness. 
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This Master’s Thesis will review radiation effects that may alter reconfigurable FPGAs 
function, and then several solution approaches will be expose in order to mitigate the effect of 
radiation particles inside FPGAs. 
 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
The use of FPGAs in high-radiation environments is not yet well accepted by many people 
inside the space market [WAL01], but there is an increasing interest in these devices due to 
the improved cost efficiency and the lower development time in comparison to other design 
options such as ASICs or discrete logic. Also advent of reprogrammable devices featuring 
millions system gates, it is not longer feasible to disregard these technologies. 
Another important advantage of SRAM-based FPGAs is their capability of being in-system 
reconfigured. This feature is especially important in space applications, because it allows 
modifying on-board hardware by replacing faulty/outdated FPGA bitstreams at different 
stages of a mission [BRO01]. Some example uses are: rectification of design faults, 
improvement of processing algorithms, alteration of system functionality in response to 




Different approaches are proposed for different situations. A first one device approach is 
considered for typical On-Board Data Handling units where a unique processor is used for all 
on-board management capabilities. In this approach, an XTMR system along with continues 
self readback/scrubbing cycles is proposed. The novelty of this approach is to reduce the 
hardware needs in terms of an external Rad-Hard configuration manager. An internal IP Core 
takes advantage of typical ROM devices used in these instruments, and coordinates the 
mitigation technique with processor’s memory access.  
 
A different approach is proposed for systems with distributed capabilities. The second 
proposal, assumes that the devices to be used will not be able to mitigate radiation failures 
induced by SEUs for the whole mission. Therefore, a redundant distributed processing with 
triplicated voters will be able to detect those errors and also keep the healthiness of the results 
for typical critical duties. For this solution COTS has been used. These COTS have been 
precisely qualified with a proton irradiation campaign to assure TID and SEL immunity up to 
reliable levels. These tests are also reported. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this master project is to find innovative designs alternatives for mitigating 
the effect of radiation on PLDs, and also evaluate future uses of this technology within 
spacecrafts and artificial satellites. 
 
1.4 THESIS’ ORGANIZATION 
This document is divided in seven chapters. First three chapters introduce the basic concepts 
related to radiation effects on PLDs as well as the state of art of mitigating techniques 
nowadays. Chapters fourth and sixth describe the innovative ideas presented by the author to 
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improve system reliability when using Xilinx FPGA in a harness space situation. The fifth 
chapter explains the results obtained from a proton irradiation campaign done over 
CoolRunner-II Xilinx CPLD to evaluate its tolerance to Single Event Latch-Ups and Single 
Event Upsets. This CPLD where selected due to its ultra low power consumption to be used 
on small satellites or self-powered sensor. Finally, chapter seven will discuss the results found 
through this master’s project and the main guidelines to follow in the near future. 
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2 RADIATION EFFECTS  
2.1 SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
 
It is important to know which the space environment is where spacecrafts and satellites will 
be operating. There are high-energy particles that will irradiate hardware provoking 
malfunctions and even permanent damage into electronic components inside. These high-
energy particles are mainly divided in three categories. The first is particles trapped by 
planetary magnetic fields such as the earth’s Van Allen Belts. The second is the 
comparatively low-level flux of ions that originate outside of our solar system called galactic 
cosmic rays. The third is bursts of radiation emitted by the sun, characterized by high fluxes 
of protons and heavy ions, referred to as solar particle events. 
 
2.1.1 Trapped Particles 
The radiation belt trapped radiation environment includes protons with energies up to several 
hundred MeV, and two electron belts, whose spectrum extends to energies of a few MeV. The 
combination of their motions in the Earth's magnetic field (gyration about field lines, 
bouncing between the magnetic mirrors, and drift around the Earth) makes the particle field at 
the spacecraft effectively isotropic [REE00]. 
 
In the following figure, a representation of the Van Allen Belts and particles trapped inside 
may be observed: 
 
 
Figure 2: Location of a radiation belt (shown in orange) whose ultimate source is material from the local 
interstellar medium.  
 
Trapped proton energies extend up to a few hundreds of MeV, at which point the fluxes begin 
to fall off rapidly. The energetic trapped proton population with energies greater than 10 MeV 
is confined to altitudes below 20,000 km, while protons with energies of about 1 MeV or less 
are observed at geosynchronous altitudes and beyond. 
Trapped protons can cause Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effects, Displacement Damage DD) 
effects and Single Event Effects (SEE). The metric used for TID studies is ionizing dose, 
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defined as the energy deposited per unit mass of material that comprises the sensitive volume. 
The unit commonly employed is the “rad” where 1 rad = 100 erg/g.  
 
There are two areas where trapped electrons are situated, in the inner zone and in the belt. In 
the inner zone electron energies range up to approximately 4.5 MeV. The flux value is about 
106 cm-2s-1 for energies above 1 MeV electrons. These fluxes gradually increase during solar 
maximum by a factor of 2 to 3. In the outer zone (or belt) electron energies are generally less 
than approximately 10 MeV. Here the long-term average value for energies above 1 MeV 
electrons is roughly 3 x 106 cm-2s-1. This zone is very dynamic and the fluxes can vary by 
orders of magnitude from day to day. 
 
2.1.2 Galactic Cosmic Rays 
Galactic cosmic rays (GCR) are high-energy charged particles that originate outside of our 
solar system and are believed to be remnants from supernova explosions. All naturally 
occurring elements in the Periodic Table (up through uranium) are present in GCR, although 
there is a steep drop-off for atomic numbers higher than iron (Z=26). Energies can be as high 
as 1000 GeV, although the acceleration mechanisms to reach such high energies are not 
understood. Fluxes are generally a few per cm-2s-1, and vary with the solar cycle [XAP06-a]. 
SEE are the main radiation effects caused by GCR in microelectronics and photonics. The 
metric traditionally used to describe heavy ion induced SEE is linear energy transfer (LET).  
 
 
Figure 3: Heliosphere cartoon with GCR entering into our Solar System.  
 
 
2.1.3 Solar Particle Events 
It is believed that there are two categories of solar particle events and that each one 
accelerates particles in a distinct manner. Solar flares result when the localized energy storage 
in the coronal magnetic field becomes too great and causes a burst of energy to be released. 
They tend to be electron rich, last for hours. Coronal Mass Ejection (CME), on the other hand, 
is a large eruption of plasma (a gas of free ions and electrons) that drives a shock wave 
outward and accelerates particles. CMEs tend to be proton rich and last for days [REA99]. 
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All naturally occurring chemical elements ranging from protons to uranium are present in 
solar particle events. They can cause permanent damage such as TID and DD that is due 
mainly to the proton and possibly gamma component. Just because the heavy ion content is a 
small percentage does not mean it can be ignored.  
 
 
Figure 4: Sketch of the Earth’s magnetosphere and its interaction with the solar wind. 
 
The sun is both a source and a modulator of space radiations. Understanding its cyclical 
activity is an important aspect of modeling the space radiation environment. The solar activity 
cycle is approximately 11 years long. During this period there are typically 7 years during 
solar maximum when activity levels are high and 4 years during solar minimum when activity 
levels are low. In reality the transition between solar maximum and solar minimum is a 
continuous one but it is often considered to be abrupt for convenience. At the end of each 11-
year cycle the magnetic polarity of the sun reverses and another 11-year cycle follows. Thus, 
strictly speaking the total activity cycle is approximately 22 years long. Magnetic polarity 
apparently only affects the galactic cosmic ray fluxes [BAD96], and not the trapped particle 
or solar particle event fluxes. Thus, things are often viewed on an approximately 11-year 
cyclical basis. 
 
Solar particle events are known to occur with greater frequency and intensity during the 
declining phase of solar maximum [SHE95]. Trapped electron fluxes also tend to be higher 
during the declining phase [BOS03]. Trapped proton fluxes in low earth orbit (LEO) reach 
their maximum during solar minimum but exactly when this peak is reached depends on the 
particular location [HUS98]. Galactic cosmic ray fluxes are also at a maximum during solar 
minimum but in addition depend on the magnetic polarity of the sun [BAD96]. 
 
To conclude this subsection, the following figure represents in a simplified manner the 
particle spectra of the near Earth space environment [XAP06-b]:  
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Figure 5: Simplified diagram of typical particle radiation spectra. 
 
 
2.2 RADIATION EFFECTS ON ELECTRONICS 
 
In this section the interaction of space environment particles with electronics will be 
described. 
 
In the interaction of energetic heavy ions with matter, the energy is primarily transferred to 
target electrons. The high energy primary electrons (also called gamma rays) decay in an 
electronic cascade, and finally produce dense plasma of electron hole pairs. When measuring 
the heavy ion capacity to produce damage to a semiconductor, we talk about LET, which is 
the energy lost by the ionizing particle per unit path length in the sensitive volume. The units 
of LET that are commonly used are then MeV-cm2/mg. 
 
Unlike heavy ions induced SEE, proton-induced SEE occur as a result of target recoil 
products that result from interactions with the incident proton. The incident proton energy has 
a significant influence on these products and that is the reason why results are commonly 
presented in terms of it. 
 
SEE are quite different to total dose radiation which causes gradual global degradation of 
device parameters and dose-rate radiation which causes photocurrents in every junction of a 
circuit. A single event interaction is a very localized effect, and can lead to a seemingly 
spontaneous transient within a region of the circuit.  
 
Heavy ions, as well as protons and alpha particles in solar particle events, can cause static, 
transient and permanent SEE. Find below a brief description on the most typical Single Event 
Effects: 
 
• Single Event Latch-up (SEL) is a condition where the parasitic pnpn structure in 
CMOS is latched to a high current state. This can either be destructive or non-
destructive. In the non-destructive case, the affected device will have to have power 
recycled to restore normal operation. Long term high current will eventually result in 
failure. 
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• Single Event Transient (SET) is the physical signal glitch caused by an SEE. This 
effect does not persist in time, however depending if it hits a combinational logic or a 
memory cell, it may propagate the error to other parts of the device. 
 
• Single Event Upset (SEU) is a bit flip or other corruption of stored information due to 
an SEE (usually applied to memory circuits).  
 
• Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) is a SEE that affects multiple circuits at once, not from 
multiple ion/proton hits but from one event. This is seen in memory cells where many 
nodes that are physically adjacent are affected (spatial relationship). It is also seen in 
sequential circuits operating at a high rate of speed, much faster than the single event, 
so that multiple clocked bits are errant (temporal relationship). 
 
• Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is an SEE that affects a critical portion of 
the circuit design, like a state machine. A SEFI is non-destructive, but may linger for a 
long time causing incorrect operation of the circuit. An example is a SEU in the 
power-on reset circuit that initiates a reset while the circuit is operational. 
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3 STATE OF ART 
We will start this section reviewing the different mitigation techniques that have been 
developed for configurable devices. Then a review the up to date studies performed over 
Xilinx FPGAs in terms of radiation sensibility over the different events studied on the 
previous section. Also a break down of the susceptible parts of the FPGA architecture will be 
reviewed and which techniques have been applied to mitigate them.  
 
A lot of test at proton and heavy ions radiation facilities has been performed to find out the 
behavioral of these devices under harnessing environment. These tests will also be discussed 
here after. 
 
3.1 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
 
Mitigation techniques are well separated in two mayor groups. The ones so called 
technological techniques are based on changing at physical level the configuration of the 
hardware it self, or changing the manufacturing process to build more robust hardware against 
radiation. Devices manufacture in such a way, are called Rad-Hard parts. This term means 
that are immune to TID, SEL and SEU up to given values. These processes are very 
expensive in compare with typical commercial ones. However, it isn’t only an economic 
matter. Even though technological processes have performed great advantages on this area, so 
has done or even more in the commercial ones, allowing electronic devices achieve speed 
marks not easily achieved with manufacture changes.  
 
The second group of mitigation techniques is applied at higher levels. These techniques are 
called hardening techniques, and seek for achieving Rad-Hard by design devices that are only 
Rad-Tolerant by manufacture. Rad-Tolerant devices are those which are immune to TID and 
SEL but not to SEU. This is the case of study of this master’s thesis. Most techniques used 
consist on applying redundant information in such a way that allows to detect or correct the 
errors induced by SEU in the memory or combinational elements. Depending on its nature, 
these techniques may be separated in two groups: 
 
3.1.1 Hardware Redundancy 
These techniques shall replicate the logic blocks in the circuit in such a way that the same 
duty is performed several times at a time. The most popular consist in replicate N-times  the 
block (where N is always an odd number) that shall be hardened and use a majority voter at 
the output to choose the correct one. This technique is named NMR (N Module Redundancy) 
and the most common application of it is TMR (Triple Module Redundancy), where the 
module is replicated three times and the method may detect and correct any single upset. The 
following caption shows a typical module with and without triple redundancy: 
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Figure 6: figure 'a' represents the original module and 'b' the TMR one. 
 
This technique has three problems on its application. First of all, it will work for single errors 
but not for multiple errors. Also a hit in the voter’s output will not only propagate the error to 
‘q’ but also will feed the inputs with erroneous data. First two are independent of the device 
used, however, when applying this inside reconfigurable FPGAs a third problem is 
encountered. Even though flip flop registers is protected, configuration memory that 
configures and interconnects everything inside the FPGA may be hit as well, and therefore 
SEU errors may accumulate causing the module to fail. In order to solve this problem, 
scrubbing cycles are recommended. These scrubbing cycles will correct the single event bit 
flips in configuration memory without interrupting the running process. 
 
Also Xilinx has developed an improved TMR method, called Xilinx TMR (XTMR). Unlike 
traditional TMR, the XTMR approach involves [XIL07]: 
• Triplicating all inputs including clocks and throughput (combinational) logia. 
• Triplicating feedback logic and inserting majority voters on feedback paths. 
• Triplicating all outputs, using minority voters to detect and disable incorrect output 
paths 
All these improvements protect against SEU in voting logic as well as SET. Also triplicating 
the IO Blocks avoid failures in the output circuit of the FPGA. However this method increases 
by a factor of 3.2 to 5.6 the used logic depending on the design [XTM08-b]. 
 
The following figure shows an XTMR module: 
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Figure 7: Module hardened by XTMR method. 
 
3.1.2 Information Redundancy 
 
The transmitted information by an electronic device may be a serial concatenation of ‘1’ and 
‘0’. If in this transmitted message a bit flip is produce a valid but erroneous data may be 
acknowledged. To avoid this situation there are several methods that adding some extra 
information may be able to detect and even correct errors on the message. In the next 
paragraphs will be described the most common information redundancy techniques. 
3.1.2.1 Parity Codes 
These are most simple codes consisting in adding a parity bit at the end of the transmission. 
This bit will indicate if the number of ‘1’s or ‘0’s is odd or even. This code has the property 
of detecting any odd number of errors in the sent frame.  
3.1.2.2 Error Correction. Hamming 
As explained at [POR07], this codes are extension of parity codes, where to correct n bits, 
another i bits are added. The number of bits added is given by the formula:  
2i ≥ i + n +1 
The original message is divided in groups and for each group a parity bit is added. For 
example for the message “n3, n2, n1, n0”, three parity bits are needed, “i1, i2, i3”. The 
information bits are divided in three groups and a parity bit is calculated: (n3, n2, n1, i3), (n3, 
n2, n0, i2), (n3, n1, n0, i1). Thus if there is an error on n3, the three parity bits will indicate 
the error, if n2 is the erroneous bit, parity bits i3 and i2 will indicate the error, and so on. 
 
Error Correction Codes (ECC) are the most common methods for correcting errors on 
memories [NIC05], especially on SRAM ones which are usually more susceptible to SEUs.  
 
3.2 SUSCEPTIBILITY MEASUREMENT METHODS 
 
When trying to measure the FPGA susceptibility it’s completely necessary to implement two 
different methods. Single Event Upsets (SEU) may alter the logic state of any static memory 
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element. Since the user-programmed functionality of an FPGA depends on the data stored in 
millions of configuration latches within the device, an SEU in the configuration memory array 
may have adverse effects on the expected functionality. 
Although, a static upset in the configuration memory is not synonymous of a functional error. 
Upsets may have no effect on functionality. This is due to not all configuration bits will affect 
in the specific design. A typical scenario where SEU may not alter the FPGA functionality is 
as shown in [XTM08-a]: 
• A SEU hit a CMC that controls unused routing (statistically this is the most likely 
scenario). 
 
Figure 8: SEU hit on unused routing. 
 
The configuration bitstream stores the information about all Lookup Table (LUT) values, 
CLB, IOB, and BRAM control elements, as well as all interconnect control. Therefore, every 
programmable element within the FPGA can be addressed with a single read or write 
operation. All of these configuration latches can be accessed without any disruption to the 
functioning user design, which means that partial reconfiguration may be used to recover 
upseted data without stopping the FPGA normal processing. 
 
The second method to be implemented when trying to test the device susceptibility is a 
dynamic test, where special FPGA features that are not accessible from the configuration 
bitstream may be tested. On [SWI05], special care was taken to test Digital Clock Manager 
(DCM) and IO Blocks from Virtex-II. Also BRAMs and embedded multiplier were tested.  
 
Dynamic test is not only useful for testing these embedded components but also to measure 
the effectiveness of the mitigation techniques. Results of these tests will be shown on the 
following sections. 
 
4 RADIATION TEST 
In this section we present two different radiation test performed. The first report is for the test 
performed by the SEE Consortium to Virtex-II FPGA.  
 
A second report of a radiation campaign to CR-II CPLD is presented. This campaign was 
performed by the author along with his laboratory working at INTA, in collaboration with 
Universidad Carlos-III de Madrid. A paper presented at RADiation and its Effect on 
Components and Systems (RADECS) 2008 international conferences and it’s attached on 
Annex 1 [GAR08]. 
 
 DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON SEU 
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES FOR PLDS PAGE 21/65 
 
4.1 VIRTEX-II TEST 
4.1.1 SEL AND TID SUSCEPTIBILITY 
 
Single Event Latch-up (SEL) and Total Ionizing Dose (TID) do not present a problem on 
Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA. The radiation hardened devices are manufactured on a thin epitaxial 
substrate.  
 
For TID these devices are guaranteed by Method 1019.5 (Dose Rate ~50.0 rad (Si)/sec) up to 
200 Krad as shown at this device family data sheet [XDS06]. 
 
As shown in [SWI04a], a XQR2V3000-FG676 device was used for these latch-up tests. All 
experiments were conducted using 15Mev/amu gold ions. The stopping power of the ions was 
changed by altering the angle of incidence between normal incidence and 60 degrees. The 
following table summarizes the change in range and stopping power as a function of incident 
angle. The applied fluxes were typically of an order of magnitude of 105 particles/cm2/s and 
multiple runs were conducted in order to obtain the total fluences shown. 
 
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of used heavy ion beam. 
 
The test setup described in [SWI04-b] was made up with the intention of being able of 
recovering from any failure condition without needing a power cycle. During the test runs, the 
DUT core and IO voltages and current consumption were captured and recorded in a running 
log. Maximum current triggers were set on the power supplies in the event of a latch-up 
condition that would result in excessive current draw. Due to the high fluxes and total 
fluences used for the latch-up testing, it was expected that the DUT would lose its 
programming early in the run and would likely be subject to multiple SEFI conditions during 
the run. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate hardware survivability and soft 
recovery without the need for a device power cycle. 
The Virtex-II XQR2V3000 device showed no latch-up during Au heavy ion irradiation test up 
to an LET of 160 MeV-cm2/mg and total fluences of 7x107 particles/cm2. 
 
4.1.2 FPGA ARCHITECTURE SUSCEPTIBILITY 
 
Several studies have been performed to analyze Virtex-II susceptibility either to proton and 
heavy ions. Here we will mention some of them divided by different architectural modules. 
As said in the previous section we may differ into two well separated groups, the static 
configuration memory that may not change at all during normal operation, and the dynamic 
part of the device that are indeed the running modules, logic and Block RAMs inside the 
FPGA. 
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4.1.2.1 Static Tests 
The test results described here are the radiation test performed by the SEE Consortium created 
by JPL (NASA) and Xilinx for testing reconfigurable Xilinx FPGAs to evaluate their 
reliability for space missions. This consortium is formed by several member from US 
companies, national laboratories and universities (i.e. JPL, Boeing Satellite Systems, LANL, 
Xilinx, etc.). The test report can be found in depth at [SWI04-c].  
For the test setup they have used a prototype board to introduce the three specific Virtex-II 
radiation tolerant devices, 2V1000, 2V3000 and 2V6000. An external software inside a PC 
performs readbacks of the configuration memory in order to count the number SEU that 
impacted on it. This application has also other capabilities as read Block RAMs, internal 
control registers and reconfigure communication ports if needed.  
 
Both, heavy ions and protons test where performed in order to quantify the impact of these 
two different particles and correlate them with each specific mission space environment.  
4.1.2.1.1 Heavy Ions 
HI tests were performed at the Cyclotron Institute, Texas A&M University in June, August, 
and November 2002 and at Berkeley National Laboratory, UC Berkeley in October 2002. 
 
After applying Edmonds and Weibull parameters to the test results, the saturated cross section 
of the Virtex-II device is shown in the following table: 
 
 
Table 2: Edmonds and Weibull Parameters for Configuration Cells Sensitivities to SEUs. 
 
Here we may see a graphical approach of the data gathered for configuration bits and block 
RAMs respectively: 
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Figure 9: Virtex-II Configuration Memory Cells Heavy Ions SEU Cross Section. 
 
 
Figure 10: Virtex-II Block Memory Cells Heavy Ions SEU Cross Section. 
 
4.1.2.1.2 Protons 
Proton radiation testings were performed at IUCF in February 2002, at LBL in January 2003 
and at the Crocker Nuclear Laboratory, UC Davis (UCD) in February, April, May and June 
2002. 
 
The following table summarizes the device sensitivities to SEUs: 
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Table 3: Measured cross section under proton beam. 
 
The following graphs show the saturated cross section vs. proton energy for configuration bits 
and block RAM respectively: 
 
 
Figure 11: Virtex-II Configuration Memory Cells Protons SEU Cross Section. 
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Figure 12: Virtex-II Block Memory Cells Protons SEU Cross Section. 
 
4.1.2.2 Dynamic Tests 
 
The dynamics test performed to Virtex-II FPGA on [SWI05-b] are much more complex than 
the static ones because real time error detection and correction must be applied. Is not the 
intention of this document to describe deeply the test setup but to inform about the test results 
gathered on it.  
 
The dynamic tests of the Virtex-II FPGA were focused on two specific functional blocks, the 
Input/Output Blocks (IOBs) and the Digital Clock Managers (DCMs). The IOBs are the 
gateways for passing all data on and off the chip while the DCMs synchronize the global 
clock signals. Testing and analysis of mitigation strategies targeting the functions used in 
typical designs such as the Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs), the embedded multipliers, and 
embedded block RAM are also reported. 
 
4.1.2.2.1 I/O Blocks Test 
Three different designs have been tested in order to validate the mitigation techniques.  
 
 
Figure 13: "No TMR" or "unprotected" control case. It has a single input connected with minimum 
routing to a single output and uses two external pins. 
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Figure 14: “TMR-in Only” case and uses three IOBs as triplicated inputs connected to a single IOB for 
output using minimum routing and a single majority voter. Thus, each channel requires tour pins. 
  
 
Figure 15: "Full TMR" case and uses three IOBs as triplicated inputs to three more IOBs configured as 
triplicated outputs with minimum routing and triplicated minority voters. Each channel requires 6 pins. 
 
All the tests performed were combined with a 0.5 Hz scrubbing rate. This prevented multiple 
upset for the same channel to appear.  
 
The result for the sensibility to SEU in the three methods is shown in the following figure. 




Figure 16: I/O block test results for LVCMOS using various mitigation techniques. 
 
For each channel of the NO TMR technique around 238 bits are involved (55 bits each input, 
63 bits each output, and an average of 120 bits in the routing). Before going to the radiation 
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facility, fault injection techniques were used to figure out how many bits were indeed 
susceptible to provoke an error on the output of a channel. Only 3 bits on the inputs and 8 bits 
on the outputs were sensitive bits. When XTMR was used (i.e. Full TMR), no sensitive bits 
were found. This results were indeed ratified with the beam results. 
 
4.1.2.2.2 DCM Test 
For testing Digital Clock Managers a test setup with an external monitor was built. 
 
 
Figure 17: Block diagram of the test setup for DCM. Duplicated outputs avoids interference of IO Blocks 
in the measurements. 
 
Every kind of errors where found while radiating: stack at logic cero or one, extra or missing 
clock edge, frequency changes and transient errors. Every time an error was detected, the 
beam was stopped and either a reset, a scrub cycle or both resolved the error. This test was 
intended to find out the cross section of DCM as well to find the method to recover from 
DCM failure. Cross section may found to be somewhat the same as for IO Blocks, regarding 
that 60 bits were responsible for configuring each DCM.   
 
However no mitigation techniques were thought to prevent errors in DCM at the date this test 
was performed. This means that even though scrubbing would fix the error, up to the 
scrubbing time a functional error will surely occur because of the clock error. New info 
recently found from the SEE Consortium, says that they has developed a new mitigation 
scheme. This method has not been tested yet at any radiation facility though. 
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4.1.2.3 SEFI Phenomenon 
 
The criteria to distinguish a SEFI from a SEU, is that a complete reconfiguration cycle is 
needed to resolve the error or that is not possible to avoid it with redundancy. There are four 
types of distinguish SEFI:  
1. Power On Reset (POR): a SEU provokes a power on reset of the whole circuit. 
2. SelectMAP: SelectMAP port becomes unreadable or with erratic behavior. 
3. JTAG: JTAG port becomes unreadable or with erratic behavior. 
4. Input/Output Block: it’s not possible for a single bit flip to change an input into an 
output or vice versa, however it may put a whole bank into high impedance state. This 
SEFI may be corrected with a scrubbing cycle. 
Typically, SEFIs are low in occurrence and are quite rare to be seen while in orbit; however it 
is much easy to find them in test environments due to the high radiation rates and fluxes used 
to accelerate the process.  
 
The SEFI cross sections for heavy ions and protons are shown in the following tables.  
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Table 4: SEFI cross  section for Heavy Ions. 
 
 
Table 5: SEFI cross section for Protons. 
 
As shown in the tables above, the probability of SEFIs induced by protons is almost cero, 
while induced by HI is quite rare too. However this errors are not avoiding errors and the 
must be taken into accounts when using single device systems. 
 
4.2 CR-II TEST 
The aim of this irradiation campaign was to evaluate the behavioral of the Xilinx® 
CoolRunner-II™ CPLD technology in harnessing radiation environment. This technology 
provides ultra-low power consumption while keeps a really good relationship between area 
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and logic capacity. All these qualities make this technology very suitable for satellites with 
low power budget and area constraints.  
 
There were three main goals to achieve during the qualification campaign: 
1. Determine the technology susceptibility to single event latch-up. If the technology is 
latch-up susceptible to proton energies bellow 60 MeV, it will be useless for space 
missions. 
2. Determine the configuration Flash memory susceptibility to SEU. This Flash memory 
keeps the configuration of the device during the whole mission, and from it the 
configuration is downloaded to the SRAM-based running logic. If this memory is 
susceptible to change during mission, no possible recovery may be performed. Thus, 
the device will become useless at some early point during mission. 
3. Determine the grade of susceptibility of the RAM-based logic to SEU. Even though it 
is foreseen that the RAM part will be susceptible to protons hits, it is important to 
quantify its susceptibility in order to evaluate the reliability of the device. 
 
There is a fourth issue that will be inherently measure. When testing with low energy protons, 
TID on each part will rise to values upper 20 Krad. A power consumption setup has been also 
built up in the Control Board in order to monitor if it is increasing due to Total Ionizing Dose. 
Although, an alpha particles test has been foreseen after the proton irradiation campaign to 
determine the TID immunity of this technology. The results of this test will also be reported. 
 
4.2.1 IRRADIATION FACILITY  
Proton testing was conducted in Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) at the Proton Irradiation Facility 
(PIF) components in the low energy area (NEB).  
 
Examples of the energy spectra for protons with energies of 64 MeV and 23 MeV are shown 
in Figure 19. The measurements were done using plastics scintillator NE102 of 35 mm 
thickness to stop the protons. No corrections due to a finite resolution and scattering effects 
are made. Beam profiles are usually set to flat during the setup using small Copper plate 
located in the beam-line about 2 m upstream. One assures the uniform field of up to 5 cm 
diameter at each energy channel. For smaller beam diameters the Copper plate must be 
removed. Without the plate can achieve beam diameters as small as 0.5 cm. 
 
Figure 19. PIF-NEB Examples of energy spectra. 
 
Energy beams available in the low energy NEB facility are presented in the Table 6: 
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Low energy proton beams 









Table 6. NEB low energy proton beams. Values update to 13/02/2007. 
 
Main features of the irradiation facility are: 
• Energy range: The energy can be selected in a semi-continuous manner between 6 
and 63 MeV by placing a proper material thickness on the beam axis. See Table 6. 
• Proton flux: < 5x108 p/cm2/sec. 
• Beam spot: circle, up to 9 cm diameter.  
• Beam uniformity: > 90% over 5 cm diameter. 
• Flux/Dissymmetry: about 5% absolute accuracy. 
• Irradiation takes place in air. 
 
4.2.2 DEVICE INFORMATION 
 
Only relative information to proton test will be notice in this section. Further descriptions 
about CR-II CPLDs may be found [CR208] and [CR202]. 
 
The DUT has three important sensibilities areas that has been monitored and tested.  
1. Non-volatile Configuration Memory: as its own name indicates, this memory keeps 
data even when no voltage is applied to CR-II. The function of this memory is to keep 
the configuration bit stream unchangeable. Whenever the device is powered up, this 
bit stream is transferred to volatile configuration memory. 
2. Volatile SRAM Configuration Memory: this memory actually configures the device 
and describes its behavior. However every time the device is powered down SRAM 
cells are deleted. 
3. Combinational Logic: although this logic is SEU sensitive too, its low density 
compare with configuration memory makes probability decrease extremely when 
talking about SEFIs induced by combinational logic. 
4.2.3 DUT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
DUT specific characteristics are shown in the following Table 7: 
 
Part Number XC2X512-7PQG208C 
Category CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device) 
Manufacturer Xilinx Inc. 
Family CPLD / EEPLD 
Technology CMOS 
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Number of Samples 6 (2 for backup) 
In-system Program YES 
JTAG BST YES 
RoHS Compliant YES 
Package Style PQFP208, HQG208 
Package Equivalence Code PQG208 
Package Material PLASTIC 
Number of PINS Total = 208 / User = 173 
Mountain Style Surface Mount (SMD) 
Reliability Level Commercial 
Min Operational Temp.  0 ºC 
Max Operational Temp. +70 ºC 
Power Supply CORE: 1.8V 
I/O: 3.3V 
JTAG: 3.3V 
Max Supply Current (mA) 1 mA at 1Mhz in dynamic mode 
Number of Configuration bits 296403 
Number of Macrocells 512 
Table 7: XC2C512-7PQG208C Characteristics 
 
4.2.4 TEST PROCEDURE 
This section will be divided into three different subsections. First one (Test Setup) will 
describe completely the hardware configuration and its functionality. The second one (Test 
Plan), will show every step we took in the test and what kind of tests did we perform. Finally 
the third part describes the personnel in charge of the different duties. 
 
4.2.4.1 TEST SETUP 
The following figure shows the five important subsystems (labeled in blue) developed for all 
different tests performed to CoolRunner-II CPLDs. Afterwards all subsystems will be 
separately described: 
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Figure 20: Test Setup inside Proton Irradiation Facility (PIF) at Paul Scherrer Institute. 
 
As shown in figure, signals between Controller’s Room and Ionization Chamber are sent 
through LVDS channels to ensure signal integrity between the 30m distance. A PC Monitor 
System is used at Controller’s Room to check real time information and perform some other 
actions explained below on section 4.2.5. 
A FPGA based board (S3-Control board) is situated 2 meters apart from DUT. This board will 
interface between LUM Board and PC Monitor, and also perform real time hardware check of 
DUT application. Further explanations of these components are written below. 
 
4.2.4.1.1 LATCH-UP MOTHERBOARD (LUM) 
LUM Board contains the Device under Test and therefore is the one situated in front of the 
proton beam. DUT is actually soldered on a skirting board that may be easily inserted and 
extracted from the LUM Board. Thus we could change between several parts avoiding TID to 
interfere in the measurements. 
For the dynamic tests (explained on section 4.2.5.2) a pattern generator has been included in 
the LUM Board. This pattern generator receives commands from S3-Control Board to start 
and stop running. It has been implemented in a smaller CoolRunner-II situated in the opposite 
corner from the DUT. Pattern used was two operands that will act as inputs of the 
mathematical operations performed by the DUT. Finally, results will be sent towards S3-
Control Board to check them. 
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Figure 21: Latch-Up Motherboard (LUM) description. 
 
4.2.4.1.2 S3-CONTROL BOARD 
This is an evaluation board from AvNet with a Spartan-III FPGA commanded by a 
MicroBlaze micro-processor. The functionality performed by the S3-Control Board will later 
be explained on section 4.2.5. A 50 pin connector is used for communications between LUM 
Board and also between LVDS RCV Board. Also JTAG interface is used to close the 
complete JTAG chain made up by 4 devices: 
1. Flash Configuration EEPROM: used to store Spartan’s configuration bit stream. 
2. Spartan-III FPGA. 
3. CoolRunner-II 128: this is the stimulus generator of the DUT application. 
4. CoolRunner-II 512: this is the DUT. 
 
The following figure shows the used parts of this board: 
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Figure 22: S3-Control Board. 
 
4.2.4.1.3 LVDS RCV BOARD 
The functionality of this board is only to send and receive signal through LVDS. This is to 
avoid signal corruption because of the long distance between the Ionization Chamber and the 
Controllers Room. Thus, this board is equipped with two LVDS transceivers, one for 
incoming data and one for outgoing data. The data is sent through a 4-pairs differential cable 
(Ethernet type) and is received in the board through a RJ45 connector. Then signal are 
distributed towards S3-Control Board and LUM Board. 
4.2.4.1.4 LVDS TRV BOARD 
The functionality of this board is only to send and receive signal through LVDS. This is to 
avoid signal corruption because of the long distance between the Ionization Chamber and the 
Controllers Room. Thus, this board is equipped with two LVDS transceivers, one for 
incoming data and one for outgoing data. The data is sent through a 4-pairs differential cable 
(Ethernet type) and is received in the board through a RJ45 connector. JTAG chain is 
connected to Xilinx Programming Cable and Serial Communications are connected with PC 
Monitor. 
4.2.4.1.5 PC MONITOR SYSTEM 
A common laptop has been used. Apart from serial terminal for monitoring duties, another 
application has been used for static test explained on section 4.2.5.1. 
 
4.2.5 TEST PLAN 
 
In order to be able to understand the radiation test performed to CR-II CPLD we must first 
describe how these devices work, and what parts do they have to be tested. 
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CR-II has two separated configuration memories. The first one is a non-volatile Flash type 
memory. This memory is used to store the configuration of the CPLD during power down 
mode. The second configuration memory is a SRAM based memory; therefore configuration 
bit stream is not keep during power down mode. There are several reasons of why CR-II uses 
these two configuration memories (access time, power consumption, on the fly configuration, 
etc) however this is not the point of this thesis and we will not explain them. The point is that 
Flash memory is in charged of storing the bit stream; however it is parallel copied to the 
SRAM memory that is the one that actually configures the logic inside the CPLD.  
CR-II is also made up logic cells, registers and IO Blocks. We will clearly separate these 
other parts in a separate group because of two reasons: 
1. This logic is not readable directly and is not distributed by the manufacturer. 
2. The size of this logic is about the 10% of the size of the configuration memories. 
 
Configuration memories may be read from our PC Monitor with a developed dedicated tool 
created specifically for this test. Therefore testing SEUs in configuration memory is quite 
easy. However when attempting to check SEU effects on the CPLD logic, is not possible read 
a map of this logic, therefore we only may check the correct functionality of the application 
running on it. Because of this, we have separated test on two different sections. First section 
or static test will check SEU susceptibility on both configuration memories. Dynamic test are 
set to find the MTBFF of the application running inside the CR-II CPLD. 
 
4.2.5.1 STATIC TEST 
PC Monitor System is the one in charged of performing periodical memory check of the DUT 
while been under radiation. The tool created for this duty is a Tcl application that interacts 
with Xilinx Programming Tool (Impact) in order to read the bitstreams from both memories. 
This tool is capable of reading SRAM memory every 3 seconds and Flash memory every 5 
seconds. We have programmed the tool to perform five SRAM readbacks per each Flash 
readback. We have chosen this 5 to 1 proportion because we expected that Flash memory is 
much less sensitive to protons than SRAM memory.  
Our principal aware on these tests is to see how sensitive Flash configuration memory is. This 
is because SRAM memory can be reconfigured by a power cycle, however to reconfigure the 
non-volatile memory a specific circuit bigger even than the CPLD must be used. Thus, SEUs 
in the SRAM memory are much more easily managed than over Flash memory. Also we 
where quite concern about how could SEUs affect Flash memory while powered off. We had 
then planned some radiation tests over the CR-II device powered off as described later on in 
this section.  
After every memory readback a parallel program performs a comparison between the two last 
bit streams and stores the number of SEUs (changes from “cero to one” and from “one to 
cero”), and then displays them in real time. Next figure shows a line time diagram of the 
readback tool: 
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Figure 23: Tcl Readback Tool. 
 
In order to get an accurate cross section of the device, we will collect data until 100 SEUs 
occurred. However, we do not foresee too much SEUs at low energies, and therefore we will 
radiate DUT up to 1e10 p+/cm2 or until 100 SEUs are detected at each energy step. These are 
the Static test we have planned: 
• Test 1:  Seven runs will be performed from 60 MeV down to 10 MeV p+. At each 
energy step the run will finish when 100 SEUs had occurred or when fluency has 
reached 1e10 p+/cm2. The DUT will be configured with a concrete pattern bit stream. 
• Test 2: same as Test 1 with a new device. 
• Test 3: A unique run with a different device and with 60 MeV energy will be 
performed. However this time we will radiate the DUT up to 1e11 p+/cm2. We want 
to see how Flash memory behaviors with very high fluencies.  
• Test 4: Two runs with a new device will be performed. However this time the device 
will be powered down during radiation. Firstly we will configure the device, and then 
we will cut power and start radiating up to 1e10 p+/cm2. When max fluency has been 
reached, we will perform a readback to check SEUs on Flash memory. The second run 
will be the same but reaching 9e10 p+/cm2 fluency. These test are meant to check 
Flash susceptibility when not powered. 
 
4.2.5.2 DYNAMIC TEST 
The application to be run inside the DUT is a segmented multiplier with two 10-bits operands 
and 20-bit result. The operands will be generated by the Stimulus Generator device (also a 
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CR-II CPLD) that will be commanded by the FPGA in the S3-Control Board. The following 
figure shows the interface block diagram: 
 
 
Figure 24: Dynamic Test Block Diagram. 
 
As seen in figure above there are three main contributors of the running application. Also the 
user will interact with the processor through the UART to start/stop the application and to 
receive real time data of the test status. 
The process was run as follows: 
1. The user sends the Start command to the S3-Control Board. 
2. The FPGA generates the Start signal towards Stimulus Generator on LUM Board. 
3. With a 1 MHz clock, the CR-II 128 starts sending operand ‘A’ and operand ‘B’ 
towards DUT. 
4. Each cycle (1 us) a new result is resolved by the CR-II under test and sent to the 
FPGA. 
5. The FPGA checks the given result and in case of error generates an error interrupt to 
inform the user about it. 
6. If an error was signaled, a power cycle will reconfigure the DUT to continue the test 
straight forward. Even though it would be better to not configure the device while 
being irradiated, due to facility operative tools, it was very difficult to measure the real 
irradiation towards DUT, if we would had to stop the beam at each functional error. 
 
The duties of each actor during the dynamic test are described here: 
4.2.5.2.1 Spartan-III FPGA 
The program running over MicroBlaze uProcessor prompts with a user menu that lets the user 
to start/stop application (multiplier) and some other info instructions. When user presses start 
button the processor sends a start command to the Stimulus generator and activates its own 
inspector system. The inspector starts then to perform the same multiplication that the DUT 
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must perform in this cycle and then waits for the DUT to send a valid data signal. Multiplier 
inside FPGA is about 40 times faster; therefore FPGA inspector will not have any problem to 
check DUT results with the correct ones. Every time DUT sends a valid data signal, the 
results are compared. If a mismatch occurs an internal counter is incremented and the error is 
signaled to the user. As will be explained later, an error on the result may be caused either by 
a SEU on the logic, or by a SEU on the configuration memory. If the memory was the cause, 
then following results will be affected too. In this case the processor powers down and up the 
DUT in order to reconfigure it and recover from the SEU. The application may be stopped 
and started at any time. 
4.2.5.2.2 CR-II 128 S.G. 
The Stimulus Generator has a very simple duty. When receives order from the processor to 
start generating patterns, it signals the DUT to start multiplying and starts up two counters 
that will generate up to 220 different multiplications. When finishes, the done signal is sent to 
the DUT and both stop running. The 1 MHz clock used to synchronize both devices makes 
the whole run to last for something less than one second. When the processor receives the 
done signal automatically starts the whole process again. 
4.2.5.2.3 CR-II 512 DUT 
The segmented multiplier has been chosen as the application to be tested because is capable to 
use almost all the resources available inside the CR-II device. This will help us in order to get 
a worst case application to be implemented inside these devices. The application starts as soon 
as receives the start signal from S.G. and starts a new multiplication every cycle (1 MHz). The 
multiplier is a 5-stage pipeline so results start outgoing towards the FPGA 5 cycles after start 
signal is asserted and a valid data is signaled every cycle. 
 
For the dynamic test we have also prepared a hardened version of the multiplier. We applied 
TMR techniques to the multiplier to mask SEUs in the combinatorial logic. We did not plan 
this to make great differences because two reasons: 
1. The logic hardened is only about a 10% of the configuration memory (that may not be 
hardened in any way). And also, 
2. Multiple Event Upsets are not masked. 
However TMR could help us in a real application to mitigate first errors and afterwards 
reconfigure the CR-II with the internal Flash contents, recovering the correct configuration 
data. 
 
4.2.6 TEST REPORT 
Six CPLDs have been tested, named DUT1, DUT2, DUT3, DUT4, DUT5 and DUT7. Four of 
them (DUT1, DUT7, DUT2, DUT3) in static mode to characterize SEU susceptibility. DUT1 
and DUT 7 were irradiated powered on in order to test RAM memory. DUT2 and DUT3 
powered on and off respectively to test Flash memory in different conditions. Run number in 
following tables is a consecutive number which starts when first CPLD test starts. Some run 
numbers are not displayed because they were used to adjust the beam. Partial Dose for each 
run and total dose at the end of irradiation device is also showed. 
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4.2.6.1 STATIC TEST 
Although “Maximum Fluence” was programmed at 1E10 protons for each available proton 
energy, run was stopped when 100 upsets were registered in order to get 10% error in 
measurement. 
 
The aim of the test in DUT1 and DUT7 was measuring SEU in RAM configuration memory. 
SEU in Flash was register too but no SEU in Flash memory was detected at these fluencies.  
 
Static Test Coolrunner Power on CPLD-DUT1 
























2 62,91 8,259E-03 1,00E+07 5,17E+09 1,00E+10 0,68 100 1,93E-08 1,93E-12 
4 49,85 9,879E-03 5,87E+07 5,18E+09 1,00E+10 0,82 106 2,05E-08 2,05E-12 
5 39,92 1,174E-02 4,24E+07 4,96E+09 1,00E+10 0,93 100 2,02E-08 2,02E-12 
6 30,29 1,458E-02 3,09E+07 5,16E+09 1,00E+10 1,20 101 1,96E-08 1,96E-12 
7 25,34 1,678E-02 2,03E+07 5,69E+09 1,00E+10 1,53 102 1,79E-08 1,79E-12 
9 20,53 1,979E-02 4,12E+07 7,95E+09 1,00E+10 2,52 100 1,26E-08 1,26E-12 
6 14,59 2,584E-02 3,51E+07 1,00E+10 1,00E+10 4,13 31 3,10E-09 3,10E-13 
15 10,76 3,270E-02 7,01E+07 1,01E+10 1,00E+10 5,28 5 4,95E-10 4,95E-14 
    Accumulated TID 17,10    
Table 8: Static Test Coolrunner Power on CPLD-DUT1. 
 
Static Test Coolrunner Power on CPLD-DUT7 
























17 62,91 8,259E-03 3,32E+08 6,30E+09 1,00E+10 0,83 123 1,95E-08 1,95E-12 
18 39,92 1,174E-02 1,92E+08 5,96E+09 1,00E+10 1,12 112 1,88E-08 1,88E-12 
19 30,29 1,458E-02 1,50E+08 5,40E+09 1,00E+10 1,26 113 2,09E-08 2,09E-12 
20 25,34 1,678E-02 1,20E+08 5,06E+09 1,00E+10 1,36 113 2,23E-08 2,23E-12 
21 20,53 1,979E-02 1,12E+08 6,69E+09 1,00E+10 2,12 100 1,49E-08 1,49E-12 
22 14,59 2,584E-02 8,61E+07 1,01E+10 1,00E+10 4,18 28 2,77E-09 2,77E-13 
23 10,76 3,270E-02 7,13E+07 1,01E+10 1,00E+10 5,28 3 2,97E-10 2,97E-14 
    Accumulated TID 16,15    
Table 9: Static Test Coolrunner Power on CPLD-DUT7. 
 
In order to check Flash susceptibility the fluencies in DUT2 (powered off) was increased until 
1E10 (run 24) and 9E10 (run25) both at 62,91 MeV.  
As no SEU was registered in DUT2 when it was powered off, an additional run was made on 
the device just to confirm the SEU data for RAM (DUT1 and DUT7) at 25MeV  
 
Static Test Coolrunner  DUT2 
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24 62,91 8,259E-03 3,58E+08 1,04E+10 29 1,00E+10 1,37   0     
25 62,91 8,259E-03 3,66E+08 9,04E+10 247 9,00E+10 11,95   0   0,00E+00 
26 25,34 1,678E-02 1,16E+08 4,74E+09 41 1,00E+10 1,27 107   2,26E-08 2,26E-12 
     Accumulated TID 14,59   
Table 10: Static Test Coolrunner  DUT2. 
 
Static Test Coolrunner Power on CPLD-DUT3 


































27 62,91 8,259E-03 3,71E+08 1,00E+11 4,5 1,00E+11 13,21 2341 0 2,34E-08 2,34E-12 
Table 11: Static Test Coolrunner Power on CPLD-DUT3. 
 
No SEU was detected Flash Memory in static test with CPLD power on or off.  
 
The following graph shows the obtained cross section of the configuration memory (RAM) in 
CR-II: 



























DUT1 DUT7 DUT3(SRAM) DUT2(Run26)  
Figure 25: Proton SEU Cross Section of configuration memory (RAM) for the CR-II. 
 
4.2.6.2 DYNAMIC TEST 
 
Dynamic Test Coolrunner CPLD-DUT4 
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29 62,91 8,259E-03 7,00E+07 1,00E+10 2,4 1,00E+10 1,32 57 5,70E-09 5,70E-13 
30 49,85 9,879E-03 5,59E+07 1,00E+10 3,0 1,00E+10 1,58 47 4,70E-09 4,70E-13 
31 39,92 1,174E-02 4,14E+07 1,01E+10 4,1 1,00E+10 1,90 50 4,95E-09 4,95E-13 
32 30,29 1,458E-02 3,12E+07 1,00E+10 5,4 1,00E+10 2,33 46 4,60E-09 4,60E-13 
33 25,34 1,678E-02 2,56E+07 1,00E+10 6,6 1,00E+10 2,68 49 4,90E-09 4,90E-13 
34 20,53 1,979E-02 2,29E+07 1,00E+10 7,3 1,00E+10 3,17 43 4,30E-09 4,30E-13 
35 14,59 2,584E-02 1,74E+07 1,00E+10 9,6 1,00E+10 4,13 10 1,00E-09 1,00E-13 
36 10,76 3,270E-02 1,40E+07 1,00E+10 12,0 1,00E+10 5,23 7 7,00E-10 7,00E-14 
      Accumulated TID 22,3    
Table 12: Dynamic Test Coolrunner CPLD-DUT4. 
 
Dynamic Test Coolrunner CPLD-DUT5 






















38 62,91 8,259E-03 5,88E+07 1,00E+10 2,9 1,00E+10 1,32 50 5,00E-09 5,00E-13 
39 49,85 9,879E-03 4,97E+07 1,00E+10 3,4 1,00E+10 1,58 66 6,60E-09 6,60E-13 
40 39,92 1,174E-02 3,25E+07 1,00E+10 5,2 1,00E+10 1,88 66 6,60E-09 6,60E-13 
41 30,29 1,458E-02 2,98E+07 1,00E+10 5,6 1,00E+10 2,33 54 5,40E-09 5,40E-13 
44 25,34 1,678E-02 7,29E+07 1,00E+10 2,3 1,00E+10 2,68 55 5,50E-09 5,50E-13 
45 20,53 1,979E-02 6,93E+07 1,00E+10 2,4 1,00E+10 3,17 40 4,00E-09 4,00E-13 
46 14,59 2,584E-02 4,98E+07 1,00E+10 3,4 1,00E+10 4,13 14 1,40E-09 1,40E-13 
47 10,76 3,270E-02 4,13E+07 1,00E+10 4,0 1,00E+10 5,23 4 4,00E-10 4,00E-14 
       Accumulated TID 22,33    
Table 13: Dynamic Test Coolrunner CPLD-DUT5. 
 
The cross section obtained for functional errors in CR-II is shown the following graph: 
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Figure 26: Proton functional error cross-section for the CR-II . 
 
Data for cross section as function of proton energy can be used with CREME96 program 
introducing orbital parameters to get SEU and error rate predictions. We analyzed obtained 
data for a 680Km orbit and 98º (foreseen OPTOS orbit). Considering 100 orbits the results are 
showed bellow: 
 
Rates SEUs/bit/second SEUs/bit/day SEUs/device/second SEUs/device/day MTBF 
(days) 
DUT 1 1,02E-10 8,80E-06 1,02E-06 8,80E-02 11 
DUT 2 1,09E-10 9,42E-06 1,09E-06 9,42E-02 11 
DUT 3 7,98E-11 6,90E-06 7,98E-07 6,90E-02 14 
DUT 4 2,90E-11 2,51E-06 2,90E-07 2,51E-02 40 
DUT 5 2,83E-11 2,44E-06 2,83E-07 2,44E-02 41 
DUT 7 1,03E-10 8,94E-06 1,03E-06 8,94E-02 11 
Table 14: Data obtained from CREME96 for a 680Km LEO, with 98 º of inclination. 
4.2.7 TEST CONCLUSION 
Taking into account the goals searched by this radiation campaign, it’s a success that we can 
come up with responses for all the questions previously done. First of all, there has not been 
any latch-up during the whole test up to 63 MeV. Therefore we may conclude that CR-II is 
immune to SEL up to that energy. Although further heavy ion testing should be consider, the 
feeling is that quite similar results should be found. 
 
We have tested Flash susceptibility to SEU even farther that what was previously expected in 
order to be sure that this memory is immune to proton particles up to 63 MeV. No SEU was 
register during the power on or off test. This has been a great success, because this means that 
we may recover from any situation with only a power cycle. 
 
We have found the saturation cross section for protons at 30 MeV and a SEU threshold at 10 
MeV. Even though this energies are quite low, when applying CREME96 to situate the device 
in a real space application, a 40 days time between failures has come up. Obviously CR-II 
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devices will not be suitable for critical systems, however they will be very useful for low duty 
cycle redundant systems, as the one exposed on section 6. 
 
Finally, we have performed test over CR-II up to 22,33 Krads without any clue that pointed to 
a system degradation due to TID. After the proton test at PSI, Total Ionizing Dose test had 
been performed at CIEMAD, Madrid with gamma particles. CR-II power consumption and 
output impedances were monitor up to 30 Krad. No variation was detected. 
4.2.8 TEST PERSONNEL 
This test has been designed and performed by INTA and Universidad Carlos-III de Madrid 
Space Environment and Facility Specialist:  
Maite Alvarez (alvarezat@inta.es) 
Sergio Esteve (estevehs@inta.es) 
 
Test Setup and PLD Specialist: 
Alberto Martin-Ortega (martinora@inta.es) 
Mario Garcia (mgvalder@ing.uc3m.es) 
 
Electronics Specialist: 
Jose Ramon de Mingo (mingomj@inta.es) 
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5 LOGIC REDUNDANCY LEVEL. SEU CORRECTION 
THROUGH SELF-RECONFIGURATION 
This approach presents an architecture for implementing radiation-hardened SoCs based on 
FPGAs. Previous works used Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) techniques together with 
scrubbing mechanisms based on partial reconfiguration. However, these solutions required 
external configuration controllers that increased the system complexity and deviated the 
design from the SoC principles. The proposed architecture uses novel self-reconfiguration 
techniques in order to eliminate the need for external components, so that a full radiation-
hardened SoC can be implemented in a single FPGA. Since self-reconfiguration allows for 
on-board remote hardware updates, reliability is tackled at two key levels: Radiation-hardened 
operation and hardware upgradeability to solve design errors. Part of this work was presented 
on [MAR08] and is attached on Annex 2. 
 
In order to achieve a Rad-Hard by design system, we must be able not only to mitigate the 
effects of SEU, but also to correct their effects on configuration memory. The mitigation is 
described in the following section. The correction technique using a self built-in module 
inside the FPGA will be described right bellow. 
 
5.1 SEU MITIGATION 
 
XTMRTool will be used to triplicate the whole design with Xilinx Triple Module 
Redundancy. Four problematic situations must be handled when triplicating the design: 
 
5.1.1 Half Latches 
A half latch is a weak keeper circuit connected to the chip enable input of every flip flop 
inside the FPGA. When a FF is not already configured by user to use that CE, the half latch is 
automatically activated. The following figure shows the half latch circuit: 
 
 
Figure 27: Half Latch circuit. 
 
As HLs are not configured by the configuration memory, it is not possible to resolve the error 
by scrubbing methods. The HL will recover its initial state passed some time. The experience 
found when testing Virtex-II FPGA on the radiation chambers tell us that the time needed by 
HL to recover is bellow one second. Although, XTMRTool may be configured to extract HL 
from the design, exporting the unused signals from the FF to GND or VCC.  
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Device logic will be triplicated using XTMRTool macros. The tool automatically converts the 
simple design into a triplicated one. 
 
 
Figure 28: Triplicated logic by XTMRTool. 
 
This method assures not single points of failure. Also the feedback voters allow the design to 
autonomously correct data paths errors. In Error! Reference source not found. we can see 
how the XTMR deals when an upset occurs in a data path. The redundant voters will correct 
the upset on the next FSM clock cycle: 
 
(a) (b)  
Figure 29: (a) Autonomous upset correction.  (b) Upset on majority feedback. Still two voters deliver the 
correct data. 
 
As in figure 22, if the outputs occur in the feedback voter, the output of that redundant module 
will be incorrect. The other two will still have valid data, and the upset must be corrected by 
reconfiguration. 
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5.1.3 Output Block 
To assure not single point of failure on the outputs, it is necessary to triplicate each one and 
join three by three in the PCB trace. The following figure shows the XTMR output: 
 
 
Figure 30: XTMR Output block. 
It is very important, especially in high speed outputs, to make the connection outside the 
FPGA as close as possible to avoid timing glitches. With this configuration, two situations 
may occur. The first one is that a SEU hits the data path of one of the outputs. Then the 
minority voter which monitors the three output signal will deactivate the output driving it to 
high impedance (Figure 24). The second situation is that a SEU hits directly in one of the 
minority voters. This will deactivate the output, even though it is correct, however the two 
other outputs will still have the correct data (Figure 25).  
 
(a) (b)  
Figure 31: (a) Minority voter detects the error and disconect the output. (b) SEU hits the minority voter. 
5.1.4 BRAM 
BRAMs are changing modules that may not be scrubbed. Upsets in user block RAM can 
accumulate and must be monitored and corrected. Simple triplication of the block RAM is 
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often not enough. Therefore, an error detecting/correcting macro is needed to allow the FPGA 
to self correct the upsets that accumulate in block RAM. The block RAM self-correction 
algorithm [MIL08] is based on a custom macro replacing a group of block RAM primitives. 
This custom macro contains the block RAM scrubber engine and associated block RAMs 
described in VHDL.  
 
The following figure shows a block diagram of the macro: 
 
 
Figure 32: Blocl RAM macro block diagram. 
 
The comparator module runs over all addresses of the triplicated BRAMs through the 
secondary port (b). Data out (Data_OutB) is then introduced inside the voters. If a mismatch 
occurs, an error signal is raised and the correct data is output off the voters (Voted_Data012) 
and presented on Din of the second port (b). When the comparator module detects the error 
signal, the counter is halted and a write cycle through the b-port is allowed.  Ones the error 
has been corrected, the counter is enabled again and the infinite process continues running.  
 
One of the drawbacks of this method is that no dual port RAMs could be used while the 
correcting macro is active. Also, an error may not be detected and corrected before a reading 
by the processor is performed, however the probability of this to happen might be 
insignificant.  
 
5.2 SEU CORRECTION 
 
The second approach is meant to correct SEUs in the configuration memory. Scrubbing 
[CAR08] will be used to avoid XTMR becoming useless because of the accumulation of bit-
flips in the configuration memory. This technique uses partial run-time reconfiguration to 
continuously re-write the FPGA configuration. If any bit-flip has occurred, it will be solved 
when the bitstream is updated in the next reconfiguration cycle. 
 
Unlike other previous approach [STU04], we have decided to include the scrubbing module 
inside the FPGA as part of the SoC. The module will be implemented as a custom peripheral 
named FPGA Hardener directly attached to the processor’s bus. In our previous work on 
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[MAR08], this module was connected to the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP). 
However we now connect externally to the Select Map ports in order to reduce the SEU cross 
section of our system. This architecture provides two major advantages over previous 
approaches: 
1. Hardware is simplified, because an external reconfiguration controller is no longer 
needed. Since the scrubbing module is connected to the SoC bus, the processor’s non-
volatile memory (Flash or EEPROM) may be also used to keep the scrubbing 
bitstream.  
2. A door is opened to a novel on-board dynamic reconfiguration. As the proposed 
architecture already offers self-reconfiguration capabilities, new bitstreams could be 
loaded with a telecommand from Earth in order to correct faulty/outdated designs. 
 
To prevent SEFI errors on SelectMap port or I/OB an external watchdog will monitor the 
FPGA Hardener. This watchdog must be reset periodically in order to check the aliveness of 
the internal module. Also, if a SelectMap SEFI is detected by the configuration module, a set 
signal must be activated. This external watchdog will then produce a 300ns down pulse in the 
PROG input of the FPGA, provoking a complete reconfiguration cycle. The following chart 


























































































Figure 33: External Connection to SMAP for Self Reconfiguration. 
 
5.2.1 Reconfiguration Cycle 
It is very important to come up with the minimum reconfiguration frequency in order to 
minimize the possibility that there are two bit flips inside configuration memory at the same 
time. To be able to figure out this number we need to situate our system on a real space 
mission, so we can make a concrete radiation environment study. Taking into account the 
results of the radiation campaigns performed by the SEE Consortium members [SWI04-d], 
CREME96 simulator has been used to adapt the Virtex-II characterization to a typical five-
year Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space mission. After applying CREME96 to the Virtex-II SEU 
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characterization on a real space orbit, we have found that we must foreseen 6.394 
SEU/device/day 
 
As noticed on [BRE08-b], SEU rates may be modeled as a Poisson process. For instance if the 
expected rate is 4 events per hour the probability of experiencing no upset is 0.018. Also the 




Figure 34: SEU rate modeled as a Poisson process. 
 
Therefore, in order to minimize the risk of accumulating SEU on configuration memory, the 
minimum period for scrubbing cycles recommended should be ten times the expected SEU 
rate. Taking into account that the SEU rate is: 
• 6.394 SEU/device/day => 1 SEU / 3.75 hour. 
 
Then the minimum scrub period is: 
• 1 SEU / 3.75 hour / 10 => 1 scrub each 22’ 30”. 
 
Of course any value below twenty two minutes and thirty seconds will lower the SEU 
accumulation probability. 
 
5.3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 
A complete SoC architecture has been designed to support a typical On-Board Data Handling 
(OBDH) functionality. This system will be based on a MicroBlaze soft-processor, due to its 
easy integration with Xilinx FPGAs and its good area-performance ratio. Attached to it, the 
whole set of typical peripherals and interfaces needed by most On-Board Computers (OBC) 
will be included, such as MIL-STD-1553 Bus Controller, RS-422, timers, interrupt 
controllers, etc. The complete triplicated SoC is shown in the following block diagram: 
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Figure 35: XTMR SoC architecture block diagram 
 
In the upper chart the UART IP Core is not triplicated because it is not used for In-Flight 
mission but only with debug purpose during AIT.  
 
The built-in scrubbing IP Core, so called “FPGA Hardener”, is described in subsection 
bellow. 
5.3.1 Built-in FPGA Hardener  
 
The FPGA Hardener is a custom IP Core that will access flash memory to read the 
configuration bitstream, and then re-write frame to frame the FPGA configuration using the 
SelectMap external port. This process will assure the FPGA a good performance against SEU, 
correcting any possible bit-flip since the last scrubbing cycle. The FPGA Hardener has a low 
priority access the external Flash memory to avoid interference with On-Board Software. The 
FPGA Hardener will be directly connected the coordinator block, which is in charge of 
sharing the external Flash memory between the scrubbing module and the processor OPB bus. 
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Figure 36: FPGA Hardener and Flash Controller Block Diagram. 
 
Configuration bitstreams for Xilinx FPGAs are organized in frames of several thousand bits, 
7872 in the case of a Virtex-II XQR2V6000. The minimum portion of bitstream that may be 
reconfigured is one frame. BlockRAM inside the FPGA Hardener will be used as an 
intermediate buffer to store frames before being sent to SelectMap port. Since Virtex-II 
BRAMs have 18Kbits, they have enough space for storing 2.29 frames of a XQR2V6000 
device. Therefore, only one BRAM will be needed to implement this intermediate buffer. 
 
 DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON SEU 
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES FOR PLDS PAGE 53/65 
 
6 DEVICE REDUNDANCY LEVEL. DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURE 
 
The distributed architecture proposed is meant to be used in a real space mission. Taking 
advantage of the ultra low power CR-II tested, and the need of complex controls over several 
sub systems and instruments, a distributed architecture with several units achieving either 
common and independents duties is discussed.  
 
To correctly understand the architecture philosophy is important to contextualize the system is 
which it will operate. A presentation of the project requirements is exposed here for a better 
understanding of the reader. 
 
6.1 MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND PHILOSOPHY  
 
OPTOS is conceptually a typical pico-satellite if taking into account its size (30 x 30 x 10 
cm), its development time (2 years) and its cost. However, this type of satellite is usually 
developed by universities to have the chance of being involved in a real space project. In this 
case, this satellite aims to be a reusable platform for helping the industry and research centers 
to have the opportunity of testing either scientific or technological payloads in harsh space 
environment. Moreover, this platform must be a reliable and robust platform from the point of 
view of space environment (radiation tolerance, temperature and vacuum), attitude control 
(strong requirements established by a camera instrument) and satellite-Earth communications.  
 
The following table resumes the most important mission requirements: 
 
Mission length 2 years 
Temperature range -30 ºC to +40 ºC
Accumulated TID 9 Krads @ year.
Orbit Polar LEO 
Max Power Budget 1.0 Watt 
Intra-Satellite Communications CAN Bus 
Table 15: OPTOS Mission main requirements. 
 
There are three mayor constraints that must be overcome to end up with a successful OBDH 
design: 
1. Low cost in terms of device procurement. 
2. Tight area limits. 
3. Low power consumption due to reduce amount of solar cells.  
 
Although OPTOS is a small satellite it has the same sub-systems (S/S) as a typical nano or 
micro-satellite. Also it is configured to support four different payloads (P/L). All these 
instruments need support from the OBDH in terms of analog inputs and outputs, digital 
interface and latch-up control to assure the healthiness of the whole satellite. OBDH shall 
provide up to 32 analog inputs, 3 analog outputs and more than 100 digital I/Os. This 
comprise the OBDH S/S to be much more complex than typical small satellites ones.  
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Because all these requirements, we propose the following OBDH architecture as the most 
suitable approach to success on this project. 
 
6.2 OBDH ARCHITECTURE 
 
The proposed architecture is based on a distributed processor where all terminals are 
connected by the CAN Bus. Each unit will be able to achieve redundantly all critical duties 
that belong to OBDH, and separately they will give their services to the S/S or P/L connected 
to them. Typical critical duties of an OBDH are: real time maintenance, self check 
supervision and P/L latch-up control. Additionally parallel processing may also been achieved 
if necessary.  The purpose of this architecture is to distribute the criticism of the whole 
system, and to achieve globally the reliability of the system making each unit to work on its 
safest mode. 
 
This design considers two kinds of units described here: 
1. Enhanced Processing Hardware (EPH): This unit is based on Xilinx Virtex-II 1000 
FPGA commanded by MicroBlaze soft-processor. The aim of this unit is to support 
the OBSW that will process communications through TTC S/S, and support ADCS 
software. These two S/Ss aim for a complex processing capability that may not be 
achieved by DOTs units. 
2. Distributed OBDH Terminals (DOT): These units are based on ultra low power 
Xilinx CoolRunner-II 512 CPLD. They are oriented to control all the other satellite 
S/S (PDU, ADCS, etc) and P/Ls (GMR, ODM, FIBOS, APIS). The will be all 
interconnected (including EPH) through an optical wireless CAN Bus, and they will 
give support in terms of intelligent control logic through the following interfaces to 
the S/S and P/L connected to them: 
a. Four ten-bits ADC inputs with a dynamic range of 0 to 3.0V 
b. Sixteen digital inputs/outputs. 
 
Prior to selecting these devices for its use in this mission, a complete study of literature about 
both was performed. In this master’s thesis has been widely demonstrated the reliability of 
Virtex-II FPGA for non-critical space missions. This device has a average SEU failure rate on 
one every 3.75 hours. As will be explained later, a power cycle is performed every eclipse 
time, this is one hour power cycle.  This will avoid cumulative SEU to appear. However, it is 
possible to have functional failures, but no probable. Although if it happens DOTs will keep 
critical duties working properly.  
 
When looking for radiation literature for CR-II CPLD, the only thing we found was a 
Neutron1 test performed by Xilinx. This test encouraged us to start a radiation campaign to 
check CR-II susceptibility to SEL and SEUs. This report was explained on section Error! 
Reference source not found.. As we plan to use these devices with a limited duty cycle, 
powering them on and off sequentially, and always keeping at least three devices up, a 
majority voter will always be possible to keep critical duties up and working. 
 
Finally the purpose of this satellite is to create a reusable platform that will service to different 
operational P/L in the future. Therefore, the use of PLD guarantees a maximum 
 
1 Neutron testing is usually done to check devices behavioral on low energy Earth radiation. Neutrons are 
particles with energies of a few KeV. 
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upgradeability without having to change hardware design associated to the new instruments. 
This added to the fact that the PLDs to be used are more than one order of magnitude cheaper 
than any other Rad-Hard processor, make this distributed solution optimal for its implantation 
in OPTOS satellite. 
 
The architecture proposed is shown in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 37: OPTOS OBDH distributed architecture. 
 
 
A more deep explanation of each unit will be presented in the section bellow. 
 
6.2.1 EPH 
This unit is in charge of supporting OBSW S/S. It has direct link with communication S/S 
(TTC) through a serial synchronous interface, and with the rest of the OBDH through the 
wireless optical CAN. EPH is a so called SoC with a 32-bits soft-processor and several 
peripherals instantiated in it. Thanks to this, EPH has a high processing capability with 
reduced area and power consumption. The following figure shows a block diagram with the 
units holding the EPH circuit board: 
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Figure 38: EPH device block diagram. 
 
Its not the aim of this project to describe the components used except for those within the 
mitigation scheme. This is for instance the FPGA and the external watchdog. 
 
6.2.1.1 FPGA 
As said before, the main mitigation scheme to be used inside the FPGA is a power cycle every 
eclipse period. This power down execution will be commanded by the internal OBSW, 
however we must assure that a non-recover status of the application (even though a software 
watchdog y also present) will not keep the device stacked for ever. To assure this, a triplicated 
internal module will be in charge of supervising the software and power off the device if not 
performed by OBSW in two consecutives eclipses. This module will communicate with 
OBSW using the secondary port of internal BRAM. The internal BRAM will be partially 
loaded at start-up with bootloader application that will get the OBSW from non-volatile Flash 
and charge it in external SRAM, were the OBSW will reside. The lasts addresses of this 
BRAM will be used to communicate with hardened power down supervisor. Here after there 
is a block diagram of the hardened module: 
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Figure 39: Hardened power off supervisor. 
 



































































































Figure 40: SoC block diagram. 
 
The external watchdog is combined Rad-Hard logic of a typical timer watchdog and a power 
up system. This power up system is meant to hold the unit powered off during 10 minutes. In 
order to save power consumption during eclipse period, only DOTs will maintain the system 
running. During that period not attitude control, except by reaction wheel maintenance, will 
be performed. This is because with absence of solar sensor data no action might be done. 
House keeping telemetry will be acknowledged and stored by the other terminals in order to 
store it in telemetry mass memory when EPH is waked up. 
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6.2.1.2 DOT 
This unit is divided in two mayor groups. First module named DOT_WD it’s a complete Rad-
Hard module to control the power on and power off the CPLD. This module will power up the 
CR-II and will maintain a watchdog timer that must be reseted by the CPLD every second to 
keep it powered. If the CPLD fails due to a SEU, then the external watchdog will power off 
the device, producing a new reconfiguration cycle the next time it’s activated. An external 
counter is used to hold the unit off for a specific amount of time. This time will be variable for 
each DOT dependent of its characteristic duties. The second group (DOT_CPLD) it’s the 
CPLD it self, with all the basic functions to attend the P/L and S/S connected to it, and to 
maintain critical OBDH duties. 
Therefore, we can say that DOT_WD is a security assurance for correct any possible induced 
errors by radiation. While DOT_CPLD is the functional OBDH terminal. 
 
The following block diagram shows a complete view of DOT unit: 
 
Wake-Up & Latch-Up Control
(RADHARD)
CoolRunner-II





































Figure 41: DOT block diagram. 
 
Even though DOTs are commanded by a CPLD, they are quite complex units. DOTs 
competences are: 
 
? Maintain the satellite real time. This process will be explained deeply here after. 
? Receive commands from Earth through EPH to operate the P/L. 
? Send the telemetries originated by P/L to be stored. While on eclipse period, keep those 
telemetries until EPH is powered up again, 
? Send HK data from S/S to be stored. As well as P/L telemetries, HK must be stored during 
eclipse. 
? Operate the different P/L. 
? Operate ADCS S/S. This is, command the reaction wheel and the magneto torques on 
board. 
? Dynamic latch-up sensing of P/L voltages. This latch-up sensing must be intelligence, 
because different P/Ls have different power consumption. 
? Ephemeris propagation might be done to help ADCS software to keep them updated after 
eclipse period. 
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? Antennas deployment after launch.  
? Camera shutter opening after launch. 





- DOT ID                  :      3 bit
- BROADCAST ID    :     3 bit
- MAX VALID MT     :   3 bit (tbc)
- VALID MT TABLE  :     5 bit x 
MAX VALID MT
NEW MSG        1 bit
FROM        3 bit
TO        3 bit
DATA      24 bit
1 bit   RX
1 bit   RX DONE
1 bit   RX BUSY
TX DONE        1 bit
SEND MSG        1 bit
MSG TYPE        5 bit
TO        3 bit
DATA      24 bit
1 bit TX ACTIVE
1 bit   TX
1 bit   TX DONE
1 bit   RX BUSY
CONFIGURATION
- DOT ID                  :      3 bit
- BROADCAST ID    :     3 bit
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
- Data, From and To are shift regs. active with RX   
BUSY.
- New Msg is clk reg from Rx Done. 
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
- TX will be retried untill de tx_done is asserted. 




- DOT ID                  :      3 bit
- BROADCAST ID    :     3 bit
2 bit   ERR_STATE
1 bit   RST
ADC_10BIT
DAC        10 bit
AN_IN        1 bit
1 bit   ADC_START
1 bit   ADC_DONE
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
- Maximum frequency clock must be provided in 
order to improve timming in each bit
- Rising edge of start will init the conversion. 
WATCHDOG
WD       1 bit
PWR_OFF      1 bit
1 bit    WD_RESET
1 bit   SHUT DOWN
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
- WD must be a pulse in order to be reset. 
- Test mode is:
“0” Nominal mode.
“1” Reset watchdog every t period.     
CONFIGURATION
- TEST_MODE         :      2 bit
TIME DISTRIBUTION
VALID_T     1  bit
SND_T     1  bit
ABORT_SND_T 1  bit  
REAL_T   24 bit
1 bit    NEW_T
1 bit    NEW_T_E
1 bit    EPH_T
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
- No snd_t will be commanded unless valid_t is 
asserted. 
- EPH_T will automatically assert valid_t and set 
real_t.
- snd_t will be kept asserted until new_t, eph_t, or a 
combination of new_t_e and a timeout, occurs.
CONFIGURATION
-TIME_LEN            :           21 bit
- E_TIMEOUT        :             2 bit
- F_TIMEOUT        :             7 bit




- OWN_ID                 :       3 bit
- VALID_PLSS          :    8 bit (tbc)
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
- Only Broadcast and own id msgs will be attended. 
- No priority messages.
1 bit               TX/RX
1 bit      SEND MSG
5 bit       MSG TYPE
3 bit         FROM/TO
24 bit              DATA
HIGHLIGTHS                                                      .                           
-This is the top level module. 
- Its a cyclical run with one second period.
- Critical duties as watchdog and latch-up control 













Figure 42: DOT VHDL module definition. 
6.3 OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION 
   
The objective for using a distributed architecture is to achieve a reliable system without the 
need of using specific Rad-Hard components, as well as to increase modularity and reusability 
of the system. Nevertheless, this architecture must be transparent for the rest of S/S in order to 
facilitate their duties.  
 
Every OBDH unit, EPH and DOTs, must be powered off periodically after a certain amount 
of time to be defined. This assures the integrity of each unit lowering the exposure time to 
radiation and assuring the recoverability in case of failure. With this methodology, we make 
sure that non unit will keep a functional failure indefinitely, assuring the system recovery in 
all cases. 
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OBDH will not be completely power off at no time. By design, it does assure that at least 
three units will be working at a time during the utile life of the satellite. This redundancy will 
allow to detect and correct error produced by SEUs. We also assure the correct maintainance 
of the satellite real time, which is a critical duty in order to execute the time tagged commands 
sent from Earth. 
 
The distributed duties that must be achieved by OBDH are: 
 
? Data management: each unit will be in charge of providing the necessary tools for data 
management of the P/L and S/S coupled to them. This is, each unit will provide the 
analogical (4) and digital (16) channels needed to acquire the data assuring its correct 
storage.  
? Storage: OBDH will have in a distributed manner at least two units with storage capacity. 
All other units must deliver the data from their own S/S and P/L through the optical 
wireless communications on-board.  
? Power Control: each unit is in charge of powering on and off its own P/L and S/S 
connected to it.  
? ADCS Management: the attitude control management will be performed also distributed 
in-between  EPH and three DOTs. EPH will be in charge of supporting the needed ADCD 
algorithms, while DOTs adjacents to the sensors (solar sensor and magnet) and actuator 
(reaction wheel and magneto torques) will operate them.  
? Real Time distribution: because no particular unit will be powered up during the whole 
mission, an specific protocol has been developed in order to guarantee a correct 
management of the on-board real time. This protocol is described bellow. 
 
6.3.1 REAL TIME MANAGEMENT 
Assumption: each powered unit with a known real time (valid or not) will participate in the 
time distribution duty. 
 
Steps: 
1. EPH will be the one in charge of receiving the on-board real time when connecting 
with Earth. Once this time is updated, EPH will distribute this teal time to DOTs units 
with specific CAN message. 
2. Every active unit will storage this time as the valid on-board real time. 
3. From that point, with a 1 second period, each active unit will try to communicate the 
real time message in the CAN bus. Because of the intrinsic behavioral of CAN, only 
the unit with the highest priority will transmit firstly.  
4. All other units will abort their own real time message as fast as the get it from any 
other unit. Then, they will compare their time with the one obtained. Depending on the 
result, two things will happened: 
a. The time is equal for each other unit. Then this time is validated and the real 
time period is ended until the next second. 
b. Some unit disagrees. Then that unit will send an erroneous real time message 
with its own real time. All other units will then send the same message with 
their own real time. A majority voting is then performed inside every unit. 
After this deterministic voting, every unit will gather the on-board real time. 
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This protocol will assure the time maintenance if EPH suffers a faulty behavior or shuts down 
during eclipse cycle. As said before, the time protocol will be active every second, however 
the time maintained is given in milliseconds magnitude, to avoid time shifts due to messaging 
delay. Time latency study for communication protocol has been performed in order to assure 
the consistency of the data timing. 
 
6.3.2 COMMUNICATIONS TIME LATENCY 
 
This subsection describes the maximum and minimum message transmission times from the 
point of view of the EPH to any P/L or S/S and vice versa. 
 
6.3.2.1 Telemetries Reception 
Reception total time of a given message since the data is generated from a S/S of P/L might 
be defined as: 
 TLatencia = Tini + TCAN + Trcp.  
 
Where: 
 Tini is the time that DOT takes to generate the message; 
 TCAN is the propagation time of the message in the CAN bus; 
 Trcp is the time that EPH takes to gather the message. 
 
Taking into account the DOT clock cycle of 2 MHz, Tini = 0,5 us.  
Taking into account the EPH clock cycle of 48 MHz, Trcp = 20,8 ns x # of instructions to 
store it in memory. An approximation of the # of instruction is given for the following 
process: 
1. Interrupts the processor. (25 instructions) 
2. Acknowledge the interruption. (10 instructions). 
3. Store data is external SRAM memory. ( 30 instructions). 
 
Total time for Trcp = 20.8 ns x 65 = 1.352 us. 
 
Finally, to figure out the propagation time we must consider the probability of message 
collision inside the bus. When you talk about collision in CAN bus, this is a unit trying to 
introduce a message when the bus is already in used. In that case, the unit must wait until that 




1. The maximum number of units (DOTs + EPH) working at a time won’t never be more 
than 8. 
2. The maximum number of data to be transmitted is limited to 3 bytes. Therefore, when 
adding CAN preamble and tail to data, the maximum number of bits to be transmitted 
through the bus is 67 bits. 
3. The CAN bus speed in this given design has been selected to 125 Kbps (8 us/bit). 
 
Therefore, the maximum transmission time for a given CAN message is:  
 67 bits x 8 us/bit = 536 us. [1] 
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If the maximum number of messages to be sent in a given instant are 8 (maximum number of 
units): 
 
TCAN_MAX = [1] x max_units = 536 us x 8 = 4.288 ms. 
 
In the best case, the minimum number of messages to be sent is 1: 
 
TCAN_MIN = [1] x min_units = 536 us x 1 = 0.536 ms. 
 
Therefore, as Tini y Trcp are not significant (at least three orders of magnitude lower): 
 
 TLatencia = (TCAN_MAX + TCAN_MIN) / 2 ± ∆ ((TCAN_MAX + TCAN_MIN) / 2),TCAN_MAX)  
 
 TLatencia = 2.412 ms ± 1.876 ms. 
 
6.3.2.2 Telecommands Transmission 
The formula to figure out the telecommands transmission is the same as the one for 
telemetries reception (see subsection 6.3.2.1). Therefore, latency time for telecommands is the 
same as for telemetries: 
 
 TLatencia = 2.412 ms ± 1.876 ms. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
The state of art and tests performed over SRAM based FPGAs has shown the strong interest 
inside the space community to get with reliable solutions to use this technology on harsh 
environments. As it always is, there is not a best configuration for every design. Each design 
has it’s own peculiarities and requirements and therefore needs more specific solutions to 
come up with the most appropriate configuration. This master’s thesis is a great example of 
that. In the distributed architecture approach presented here, has been demonstrated how this 
solution takes advantage of a complex system with several devices, using them to mitigate 
errors redundantly. This has allowed lowering the system total cost while achieving a great 
level of failure tolerance. In the other hand, a Rad-Hard by design complete System on Chip 
has been presented. Instruments and payloads with high computing needs, may take 
advantage of this proposal to improve by several orders of magnitude its tolerance to radiation 
environments.  
 
Even though we have seen that right now is impossible to come up with a single chip solution 
completely immune to radiation because SEFI errors, we must take into account that its cross 
section is very low. For LEO or GEO orbits where heavy ions fluxes are so low, it will be 
quite rare to find one SEFI during a whole space mission, typically less than 15 years long.  
 
Further work must be performed in the understanding of FPGAs internal configuration, to be 
able to come up with more effective solutions, taking into account banks differentiation, triple 
module domains separation, etc. The techniques proposed here must been improved taking 
into account Multiple Bits Upsets. The study of this phenomena and a good comprehension of 
it will allow develop enhanced techniques to avoid system failures. 
 
One other thing of great interest for the author and the space community is the study of 
secure, hi-reliable solutions for On-Board reconfiguration. This technique will be a high add 
value to use SRAM FPGAs, allowing adding new hardware features and correcting design 
errors while on flight configuration. 
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 ANNEX 1 
 
The Effects of Proton Irradiation on  
CoolRunner-II™ CPLD Technology 
 
Mario García-Valderas1, Marta Portela-García1, Celia López-Ongil1, Luis Entrena1  
Alberto Martin-Ortega2, Jose Ramón de Mingo2, Maite Alvarez, 2 Sergio Esteve2, Santiago Rodriguez2 
Abstract— Nowadays, Complex Programmable Devices are 
highly demanded in space missions. In this sense, CoolRunner-
II devices are very attractive due to their low-power 
consumption. However, there is no report on proton sensitivity 
for this technology until date. In this work proton irradiation 
tests were performed on these devices in the energy range 
from 6 to 63 MeV in both static and dynamic modes. The 
results reported allow considering these devices suitable for 
space applications. 
 
Index Terms— CPLD technology, proton irradiation effects, 
single event effect, single event upset, TID, test facilities 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of Complex Programmable Logic Devices 
(CPLD) has been traditionally restricted in circuits working 
in space or nuclear energy applications because of its 
susceptibility to radiation effects. The goal of this work is to 
evaluate the sensitivity to proton irradiation of Xilinx® 
CoolRunner-II™ CPLD (CR-II) technology [1]. This 
technology differs notably from conventional CPLD 
technology in that it is true CMOS and provides very low 
power consumption along with higher noise immunity and 
more possibilities in packaging. Although these devices are 
neither designed nor guaranteed to function in high 
radiation environments [2], they have interesting features 
for aerospace applications. In particular, OPTOS satellite 
project [3] is considering the use of CR-II devices to deal 
with very low power sub-systems and multiple redundant 
sensors. 
Xilinx has already published results on CR-II radiation 
sensitivity for neutron related effects [4]. These results are 
important to characterize fault tolerance for devices 
working in atmospheric environments. When these devices 
are placed within space environment, proton and heavy ion 
irradiation tests must be also performed. Proton irradiation 
experiments on CR-II technology should consider its 
internal structure. This technology implements two 
configuration memories that enable On-the-fly 
reconfiguration and, therefore, small reconfiguration times. 
A non-volatile memory (Flash) stores configuration that can 
be downloaded onto volatile configuration memory 
(SRAM) every time the device is powered up or restarted. 
Although Flash memory devices have been thoroughly 
studied for working in space radiation environment [5] [6], 
proton testing is not very common. Furthermore, proton 
sensitivity of programmable devices with Flash 
configuration memories has been tested previously in few 
cases. We have found some reports on applications in space 
missions and in terrestrial experiments with high energy 
particles (ATLAS-LHC, Large Hadron Collider at CERN), 
[5]-[9]. On the other hand, there is a growing interest in the 
study and characterization of sensitivity of SRAM 
programmable devices with respect to different particles 
(neutrons, protons and heavy ions). Although this 
technology is not aimed for space applications, memory 
blocks and FPGA devices have been tested and results have 
been reported in several works,  [10]-[12]. Even with these 
experimental results, irradiation experiments must be 
performed on CR-II devices in order to test their proton 
sensitivity. However, there is no report on proton sensitivity 
until date with this technology. The results provided in this 
paper demonstrate that these devices may be considered for 
its use in non-critical space missions without major 
hardening solutions, and to use them in critical missions 
with protection schemes is also possible.  
 
DEVICE TECHNOLOGY 
CoolRunner-II technology is true CMOS not only in 
process technology but also in design technique. Instead of 
employing a sense amplifier for the product terms, 
configurable multiplexers are attached to the inputs of a 
CMOS NAND gate [1]. The avoidance of these sense 
amplifiers and the use of true CMOS technology imply a 
great reduction in power consumption, since no component 
is drawing current in standby state.  
With respect to Fault Tolerance, CR-II devices present 
 three important sensitive areas that should be monitored and 
tested. 
Non-volatile Configuration Memory. This memory keeps 
the configuration bitstream unchanged. Whenever the 
device is powered up, this bitstream is transferred onto 
volatile configuration memory. 
Volatile SRAM Configuration Memory. This memory 
actually configures the device and describes its 
behavior. However, SRAM cells are deleted every 
time the device is powered down. 
Sequential Logic. Although this part is SEU sensitive too, 
error probability is very low compared to 
configuration memory. Typically, the number of user 
flip-flops is 512 while configuration memory cells are 
around 290.000. 
EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS 
Proton irradiation testing was performed in Paul Scherrer 
Institute (PSI), Laboratory for Astrophysics, at the Proton 
Irradiation Facility (PIF) components in the low energy area 
(NEB), [13]. This facility is member of European 
Component Irradiation Facilities (ECIF) supported by the 
European Space Agency (ESA). The energy available in the 
test facility ranges from 6 to 63 MeV, while proton flux can 
be up to 5·108 p/cm2·s. The beam spot is a circle with a 
diameter up to 9 cm. The beam uniformity is 90% over a 5 
cm diameter area. The flux dosimetry presents an accuracy 
of 5%. 
Data presented in this paper were collected over an 
experiment carried out on February 14th 2007 on six 
samples (XC2C512-7PQG208C). All irradiation 
experiments take place in air. Figure 1 shows the five main 
subsystems developed for all different test performed to 
CR-II CPLDs. Irradiated devices are located in the Latch-
Up Motherboard (LUM). As shown in Fig. 1, signals 
between Controller’s Room and Ionization Chamber are 
sent through LVDS channels to ensure signal integrity 
through the 30 m distance. A PC Monitor System is used at 
Controller’s Room to check real time information. An 
FPGA-based board (S3-Control board) is located 2 meters 
away from irradiated board. This board interfaces between 
LUM Board and PC Monitor, and also performs real time 
hardware check of DUT application 


















































Figure 1. Test Setup inside Proton Irradiation Facility (PIF) 
at Paul Scherrer Institute. 
Latch-Up Motherboard (LUM) contains the Device 
under Test (DUT) and it is located in front of the proton 
beam. DUT is mounted on a daughter board that may be 
easily inserted on and removed off the LUM board.  
For the dynamic tests, a pattern generator is also included 
in the LUM board. It receives commands from S3-Control 
Board to start and stop running. It is implemented in a 
smaller CR-II device (XC2C128) located in the opposite 
corner from the DUT. Finally, results are checked in S3-
Control Board. 
S3-Control Board is an evaluation board from AvNet 
with a Spartan-III FPGA commanded by a MicroBlaze 
microprocessor. A 50 pin connector is used for 
communications between LUM board and also between 
LVDS RCV Board. Also JTAG interface closes the 
complete JTAG chain consisting of the four programmable 
devices (Flash Configuration EEPROM (Spartan’s), 
Spartan-III FPGA, CoolRunner-II 128, CoolRunner-II 512). 
Static Test 
The purpose of static test is to check the memory 
sensitivity, for this technology, when containing a 
configuration scheme. Initially both configuration 
memories contain the same scheme. Flash memory 
maintains configuration data, once stored, along successive 
power-offs and power-ons. On the other hand, SRAM 
memory maintains configuration data only while device is 
powered on.  
CoolRunner-II devices are supposed to work in short 
time slots. Thus, continuous shut-downs and power-ons will 
be performed. Therefore, flash memory has been tested in 
these both states, in order to check the configuration data 
maintenance under harsh environments, while SRAM 
memory has been tested just in on-mode, as every time the 
device is powered on this memory is completely rewritten.  
In this test, PC Monitor System performs periodical 
memory check of the DUT while under radiation. 
Continuous readbacks are performed during irradiation 
experiments in order to detect any change in Flash and 
SRAM configuration memories. Radiation test with the 
device powered down are also performed in order to check 
Flash memory TID in this mode. The device is changed 
quite often in order to avoid TID interfering in the SEU 
tests. No device was radiated over 22 kRad. 








































































































 Graph 1. Proton SEU Cross-section for the CPLD (CR- II) 
Dynamic Test 
The purpose of this test is to check device sensitivity 
when running an application. As no reboot is performed 
during test, only SRAM configuration memory is analysed. 
Only a part of configuration bites is used for a given 
application; therefore, radiation results from this test will be 
better than for static test. The selected application must use 
a great part of device resources in order to obtain a 
representative measurement of technology susceptibility. 
The application to be run in the DUT is a pipelined 
multiplier with two 10-bits operands and 20-bit result. The 
multiplier (5-stage pipelined) prototyped in the DUT uses 
almost all the resources available inside the tested device. 
The operands are generated by the Pattern Generator device 
that is commanded by the FPGA in the S3-Control Board. 
220 different multiplications are executed for every start 
command. The user can interact with the processor through 
the UART to start/stop the application and to receive real 
time data of the test status. For testing purposes, application 
is commanded by a 1 MHz clock. During the whole 
execution, the Spartan-III FPGA is checking multiplier 
results in order to detect any error. All errors are reported to 
the PC monitor with an interruption. When an error is 
detected, readback of SRAM configuration memory is 
performed in order to check the number of erroneous bits. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Six CPLDs have been tested. Four of them (DUT1, 
DUT7, DUT2, DUT3) have been tested in static mode to 
characterize Total Ionization Dose (TID) and SEU 
sensitivity. DUT1 and DUT7 were irradiated powered on in 
order to test RAM memory. DUT2 and DUT3 were 
powered off and on respectively to test Flash memory in 
different conditions. Dynamic tests were carried out on 
DUT4 and DUT5. 
1. Static Test 
The aim of the test on DUT1 and DUT7 was measuring 
SEUs in SRAM. The results are shown in Table 1. Flash 
memory was also monitored but no SEU was observed. 
Although maximum fluence was programmed at 1E10 
protons for each available proton energy, run was stopped 
when 100 upsets were registered in order to get 10% error 
in measurement [14]. 
In order to check Flash susceptibility, the fluence in 
DUT2 (powered off) was increased up to 1E10 (run 24) and 
9E10 (run25), both at 62.91 MeV. No SEU was registered 
in DUT2 while powered off. This test is required for 
OPTOS application as CPLDs will be powered off several 
times during its working life. An additional run was made 
with the same device powered on just to confirm the SEU 
data for SRAM at 25MeV. The results for DUT2 and DUT3 
(powered on) are shown in Table 2. Graph 1 shows cross-
section as a function of proton energy for these tests. 
2. Dynamic Test 
DUT4 and DUT5 where tested under proton beam during 
normal operation. The running process was monitored and 
stored by the PC System through the S3-Control Board. 
Every time a SEFI (Single Event Functional Interrupt) 
was detected, the PC Monitor stored the data and reset the 
DUT to continue monitoring the effects of SEUs in the 
running application.  
The results are shown in Table 3. Graph 2 shows cross-
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Figure 2. Expected proton SEE rate 
3. Test conclusions 
SEU and SEFI rate predictions are got from CREME96 
code from cross section data (as a function of proton 
energy) and orbital parameters. We analysed the obtained 
data for a 680 km orbit and 98º (typical Low Earth Orbit). 
Considering 100 orbits the results are shown in Figure 2. 
This figure shows SEU and MTBF expected for DUTs in 
static tests (DUT2, DUT7, DUT1 and DUT3); as well as 
SEFIs and MTBFF for DUTs in dynamic tests (DUT4 and 
DUT5). 
No parts failed from TID up to 22 kRad. No Single Event 
Latch-up was detected for proton energies up to 63MeV 
and fluences around 1010 protons/cm2. Cross-section did 
not increase for proton energies greater than 30 MeV 
(Saturation Cross-section), while proton energy threshold 
is less than 10MeV. 
No SEU was observed in the whole test inside Flash 
memory, neither when the DUT was powered-on nor 
powered-off. 
CONCLUSIONS 
CR-II devices present an ultra low power consumption 
and wide configurability. This makes them very suitable 
for self powering sensors and small format subsystems. 
As described previously, no SEE has been detected in 
 Flash memory at any time during the tests. This is very 
good news, as it means that an application may be 
recovered at any time by powering off and on the device.  
Regarding volatile memory sensitivity we have found 
(Graph. 1) that SRAM cells are quite sensitive to protons 
with energies greater than 15 MeV. However, according 
to data obtained from CRÈME 96 (Figure 2), an MTBF of 
11 days is expected in the worst case. In real applications, 
the MTBFF will be several times higher, since only a 
fraction of the SEUs will produce a functional failure. 
Taking into account that lots of applications do not need 
to be running all the time, it is possible to reboot CR-II 
whenever it is on IDLE state. In the scope of the OWLS 
project [15], housekeeping is intended to become 
wireless. On every satellite there are thousands of 
temperature sensors that might be shut down several times 
every second. For this kind of application the probability 
of failure is very low. Thus, CR-II may not be suitable for 
use within critical applications, but it may be a great 
choice for non-critical ones.  
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2 62,91 8,259E-03 1,00E+07 5,17E+09 1,00E+10 0,68 100 1,93E-08 
4 49,85 9,879E-03 5,87E+07 5,18E+09 1,00E+10 0,82 106 2,05E-08 
5 39,92 1,174E-02 4,24E+07 4,96E+09 1,00E+10 0,93 100 2,02E-08 
6 30,29 1,458E-02 3,09E+07 5,16E+09 1,00E+10 1,20 101 1,96E-08 
7 25,34 1,678E-02 2,03E+07 5,69E+09 1,00E+10 1,53 102 1,79E-08 
9 20,53 1,979E-02 4,12E+07 7,95E+09 1,00E+10 2,52 100 1,26E-08 





15 10,76 3,270E-02 7,01E+07 1,01E+10 1,00E+10 5,28 5 4,95E-10 
 Accumulated TID 17,10   
17 62,91 8,259E-03 3,32E+08 6,30E+09 1,00E+10 0,83 123 1,95E-08 
18 39,92 1,174E-02 1,92E+08 5,96E+09 1,00E+10 1,12 112 1,88E-08 
19 30,29 1,458E-02 1,50E+08 5,40E+09 1,00E+10 1,26 113 2,09E-08 
20 25,34 1,678E-02 1,20E+08 5,06E+09 1,00E+10 1,36 113 2,23E-08 
21 20,53 1,979E-02 1,12E+08 6,69E+09 1,00E+10 2,12 100 1,49E-08 





23 10,76 3,270E-02 7,13E+07 1,01E+10 1,00E+10 5,28 3 2,97E-10 
 Accumulated TID 16,15   
Table 1. Static Test CoolRunner-II Powered on 
 
 























24 62,91 8,259E-03 3,58E+08 1,04E+10 29 1,00E+10 1,37   0   
25 62,91 8,259E-03 3,66E+08 9,04E+10 247 9,00E+10 11,95   0   DUT2 
26 25,34 1,678E-02 1,16E+08 4,74E+09 41 1,00E+10 1,27 107   2,26E-08
     Accumulated TID 14,59    
DUT3 27 62,91 8,259E-03 3,71E+08 1,00E+11 4,5 1,00E+11 13,21 2341 0 2,34E-08
Table 2. Static Test CoolRunner-II 












(krad) SEFI  
Cross Section
per device  
29 62,91 8,259E-03 7,00E+07 1,00E+10 2,4 1,00E+10 1,32 57 5,70E-09 
30 49,85 9,879E-03 5,59E+07 1,00E+10 3,0 1,00E+10 1,58 47 4,70E-09 
31 39,92 1,174E-02 4,14E+07 1,01E+10 4,1 1,00E+10 1,90 50 4,95E-09 
32 30,29 1,458E-02 3,12E+07 1,00E+10 5,4 1,00E+10 2,33 46 4,60E-09 
33 25,34 1,678E-02 2,56E+07 1,00E+10 6,6 1,00E+10 2,68 49 4,90E-09 
34 20,53 1,979E-02 2,29E+07 1,00E+10 7,3 1,00E+10 3,17 43 4,30E-09 





36 10,76 3,270E-02 1,40E+07 1,00E+10 12,0 1,00E+10 5,23 7 7,00E-10 
     Accumulated TID (DUT4) 22,33   
38 62,91 8,259E-03 5,88E+07 1,00E+10 2,9 1,00E+10 1,32 50 5,00E-09 
39 49,85 9,879E-03 4,97E+07 1,00E+10 3,4 1,00E+10 1,58 66 6,60E-09 
40 39,92 1,174E-02 3,25E+07 1,00E+10 5,2 1,00E+10 1,88 66 6,60E-09 
41 30,29 1,458E-02 2,98E+07 1,00E+10 5,6 1,00E+10 2,33 54 5,40E-09 
44 25,34 1,678E-02 7,29E+07 1,00E+10 2,3 1,00E+10 2,68 55 5,50E-09 
45 20,53 1,979E-02 6,93E+07 1,00E+10 2,4 1,00E+10 3,17 40 4,00E-09 





47 10,76 3,270E-02 4,13E+07 1,00E+10 4,0 1,00E+10 5,23 4 4,00E-10 
     Accumulated TID (DUT5) 22,33   
Table 3. Dynamic Test CoolRunner-II  
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ABSTRACT 
SRAM-based FPGAs are increasingly being 
used in space applications. However, there are 
still many concerns about the reliability of these 
devices in high-radiation environments, 
particularly due to the possibility of Single-
Event Upsets (SEUs) in the configuration 
memory. This paper presents an architecture for 
implementing radiation-hardened SoCs based on 
FPGAs. Previous works used Triple Module 
Redundancy (TMR) techniques together with 
scrubbing mechanisms based on partial 
reconfiguration. However, these solutions 
required external configuration controllers that 
increased the system complexity and deviated 
the design from the SoC principles. The 
proposed architecture uses novel self-
reconfiguration techniques in order to eliminate 
the need for external components, so that a full 
radiation-hardened SoC can be implemented in a 
single FPGA. Since self-reconfiguration allows 
for on-board remote hardware updates, reliability 
is tackled at two key levels: Radiation-hardened 
operation and hardware upgradeability to solve 
design errors. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of FPGAs in high-radiation 
environments is not yet well accepted by many 
people inside the space market [1], but there is 
an increasing interest in these devices due to the 
improved cost efficiency and the lower 
development time in comparison to other design 
options such as ASICs or discrete logic. The 
most serious drawback of PLDs in space 
applications comes from the fact that SEUs may 
alter the configuration memory of SRAM-based 
FPGAs. To avoid this issue, Xilinx developed a 
technique based on a continuous FPGA 
reconfiguration [2], which is commonly known 
as scrubbing. This mechanism is usually 
complemented by classic TMR techniques to 
prevent errors on user flip-flops. Users do not 
need to implement TMR by themselves, 
applications such as Xilinx TMRTool [3] can be 
used to automatically harden an existing design. 
 Another important advantage of SRAM-
based FPGAs is their capability of being in-
system reconfigured. This feature is especially 
important in space applications, because it 
allows modifying on-board hardware by 
replacing faulty/outdated FPGA bitstreams at 
different stages of a mission [4]. Some example 
uses are: rectification of design faults, 
improvement of processing algorithms, 
alteration of system functionality in response to 
changed mission requirements, modification of 
hardware configurations to reduce power 
characteristics, etc.  
 FPGA reconfiguration can be static or 
dynamic. The former requires that the system 
has to be stopped and rebooted when its FPGAs 
are reconfigured. The latter allows for the system 
to continue running during reconfiguration. All 
modern (since Virtex family) Xilinx FPGAs 
support dynamic reconfiguration through run-
time partial reconfiguration, that is, part of the 
device can be reconfigured while the rest of it 
continues its normal operation. The most 
compelling mode of dynamic reconfiguration is 
self-reconfiguration, where the FPGA itself 
changes part of its configuration at run-time [5]. 
Virtex-II devices, as well as Virtex 4 and 5, 
provide the Internal Configuration Access Port 
(ICAP), an internal configuration interface 
specifically designed to enable self-
reconfiguration.  
 In the following section, a brief overview 
about radiation effects is provided. Section 3 
details a methodology for SEU mitigation. 
Section 4 describes the proposed architecture for 
radiation-hardened FPGA-based SoCs. Next, 
section 5 discusses the reconfiguration cycles 
needed to avoid SEUs. Finally, section 6 
presents the conclusions. 
 RADIATION EFFECTS 
Several FPGA vendors already provide radiation 
tolerant devices, immune to Single Event Latch-
ups (SELs) and capable of withstanding high 
Total Irradiation Doses (TIDs). Moreover, non-
reconfigurable devices based on One Time 
Programmable (OTP) technologies have 
achieved very good immunity to SEUs.  
 However, SEUs are still a major concern in 
SRAM-based FPGAs, even in radiation-
hardened devices. Fortunately, FPGA-oriented 
SEU mitigation techniques have been 
significantly improved in the recent years, 
mainly due to manufacturers' efforts. The 
following subsection summarizes the existing 
literature for Xilinx Virtex-II, a device capable 
of implementing the architecture proposed in this 
paper. 
Previous Studies 
Because of the complexity of current 
programmable logic devices, it is very difficult 
to determine the sensitivity of a FPGA-based 
system to SEUs. According to [6], there are two 
approaches to SEU testing, static and dynamic. 
Static SEU testing only determines the 
sensitivity of each memory element, without 
observing the effects on the functionality of the 
application. Dynamic SEU testing takes into 
account the functionality of the circuit 
implemented in the FPGA. The static SEU 
characteristic of Virtex-II devices can be easily 
measured using configuration readback, which 
returns the state of most storage cells of the 
device: Configuration bits, BlockRAM and user 
flip/flops. Based on testing made in [7]: 
? SEU cross section is 3.8x10-8 cm2/bit for 
Heavy Ions (HI) with a effective LET of 
142 MeV and up to 5.8x103 ion/cm2. 
? SEU cross section is 3.7x10-14 cm2/bit for 
Protons (p+) of up to 198 MeV, flux 
greater than 109 particles/(cm2·s) and 
fluencies of 1011 p+/cm2. 
 These results show that the SEU sensitivity 
of Virtex-II devices should be considered high. 
Although static testing provides a valuable 
indication of the SEU sensitivity of the device, 
what designers need to know is the actual effect 
of SEUs in their systems. In particular, what has 
to be demonstrated is the usability and reliability 
of the FPGA in space environments. It is 
therefore necessary to characterize the behavior 
of the applications implemented in the FPGA 
when SEU mitigation techniques are being 
applied. 
 Several studies have been performed over 
Radiation Tolerant Virtex-II designs using both 
TMR and scrubbing techniques for SEU 
mitigation. In [8], Saab Ericson Space (under 
ESA contract) performed several tests to Virtex-
II FPGAs, implementing different designs and 
using different TMR techniques from Xilinx 
(XTMR_v1 and XTMR_v2). This document 
concludes that using XTMR as a mitigation 
technique greatly improves the device cross 
section for Single Event Functional Interrupts 
(SEFIs). But not only that, the test performed by 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) [7] states 
that "it was never observed that only a part of 
the device had a failure that couldn’t be repaired 
by the scrubbing of the configuration bits (Stuck 
Error)". This JPL test concludes that when both 
mitigation methods, TMR and scrubbing, are 
implemented together,  the design appears to be 
essentially immune to functional errors. 
SEU MITIGATION PROPOSAL 
This section describes the SEU mitigation 
methodology used to by the proposed Rad-Hard 
By Design (RHBD) SoC architecture. As stated 
in [9], to achieve the best results we must use a 
prevention method combined with error 
correction method. A complete description of 
this architecture can be found on section 4.  
SEFI Prevention 
Two main combined approaches have been 
designed to harden the FPGA. The first 
approach is based on prevention of errors when 
SEUs cause bit flips either in the  configuration 
memory, data memory or combinational paths. 
The technique to be used is Xilinx XTMR [3]. 
This technique has several advantages when 
compared with traditional TMR techniques, and 
also shortens development time because 
redundancy is automatically managed by the 
Xilinx TMRTool. 
 Traditional TMR does not protect against 
SEUs in voting logic or against Single-Event 
Transients (SETs), and does not lend itself well 
to the reconfigurable features of Xilinx FPGAs. 
Unlike traditional TMR, the XTMR approach 
involves:  
? Triplicating all inputs including clocks 
and combinational logic, 
? Triplicating feedback logic and inserting 
majority voters on feedback paths, 
? Triplicating all outputs, using minority 
voters to detect and disable incorrect 
output paths. 
 The other major difference between 
traditional TMR approaches and the XTMR 
technique is that the redundant domains 
converge on the printed circuit board. If an 
upset occurs somewhere in the design, one of 
the redundant design domains will behave 
 differently from the others. The output voter for 
that domain will detect that its domain is 
behaving differently, and will place its pin in a 
high impedance state. The other two domains 
will continue to operate correctly, driving the 
correct output off the chip. If a voter is upset, 
the worst it can do is disable the output of a 
domain that is behaving correctly. As with the 
first scenario, the other domains will continue to 
operate correctly, driving the correct output off 
the chip. 
SEU Correction 
The second approach is meant to correct SEUs 
in the configuration memory. Scrubbing [2] will 
be used to avoid XTMR becoming useless 
because of the accumulation of bit-flips in the 
configuration memory. This technique uses 
partial run-time reconfiguration to continuously 
re-write the FPGA configuration. If any bit-flip 
has occurred, it will be solved when the 
bitstream is updated in the next reconfiguration 
cycle. A complete study has been performed in 
order to adjust the frequency of the 
reconfiguration, see section 5. 
 Unlike any other previous approach [7][8], 
we have decided to include the scrubbing 
module inside the FPGA,  as part of the SoC. 
The module will be implemented as a custom 
peripheral, directly attached to the processor’s 
bus and connected to the Internal Configuration 
Access Port (ICAP). This architecture provides 
two major advantages over previous 
approaches: 
? Hardware is simplified, because an 
external reconfiguration controller is no 
longer needed. Since the scrubbing 
module is connected to the SoC bus, the 
processor’s non-volatile memory (Flash 
or EEPROM) may be also used to keep 
the scrubbing bitstream.  
? A door is opened to a novel on-board 
dynamic reconfiguration. As the proposed 
architecture already offers self-
reconfiguration capabilities, new 
bitstreams could be loaded with a 
telecommand from Earth in order to 
correct faulty/outdated designs. 
 There is however a drawback in the 
proposed approach,  it is possible that a SEU 
hits the FPGA internal configuration logic, 
leaving the ICAP unusable. This is nevertheless 
a problem existing too in the designs using an 
external scrubbing controller. The solution is 
using a external FPGA watchdog that will be 
fired it the problem is detected, for example by 
reading unexpected data from a well-known 
configuration register. FPGA-based space 
systems usually provide external watchdogs, so 
this solution should not imply an increase in the 
complexity of the system. 
Fig 1. FPGA Hardener and Flash Controller modules. 
 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
A complete SoC architecture has been designed 
to support a typical On-Board Data Handling 
(OBDH) functionality. This system will be 
based on a MicroBlaze soft-processor, due to its 
easy integration with Xilinx FPGAs and its 
good area-performance ratio. Attached to it, the 
whole set of typical peripherals and interfaces 
needed by most On-Board Computers (OBC) 
will be included, such as MIL-STD-1553 Bus 
Controller, RS-422, timers, interrupt controllers, 
etc. The new built-in scrubbing IP Core, so 
called “FPGA Hardener”, is described in 
subsection 4.1.  
Built-in FPGA Hardener 
The FPGA Hardener is a custom IP Core that 
will access flash memory to read the 
configuration bitstream, and then re-write frame 
to frame the FPGA configuration using the 
Internal Configuration Access Port. This 
process will assure the FPGA a good 
performance against SEU, correcting any 
possible bit-flip since the last scrubbing cycle. 
 
 
 Configuration bitstreams for Xilinx FPGAs 
are organized in frames of several thousand bits, 
7872 in the case of a Virtex-II XQR2V6000. 
The minimum portion of bitstream that may be 
reconfigured is one frame. BlockRAM inside 
the FPGA Hardener will be used as an 
intermediate buffer to store frames before being 
sent to the ICAP (see Fig. 1). Since Virtex-II 
BRAMs have 18Kbits, they have enough space 
for storing 2.29 frames of a XQR2V6000 
 device. Therefore, only one BRAM will be 
needed to implement this intermediate buffer. 
 The FPGA Hardener will be directly 
connected the coordinator block, which is in 
charge of sharing the external Flash memory 
between the scrubbing module and the 
processor OPB bus.   
RECONFIGURATION CYCLE 
It is very important to come up with the 
minimum reconfiguration frequency in order to 
minimize the possibility that there are two bit 
flips inside configuration memory at the same 
time. To be able to figure out this number we 
need to situate our system on a real space 
mission, so we can make a concrete radiation 
environment study. Taking into account the 
results of the radiation campaigns performed by 
the SEE Consortium members [7], CREME96 
simulator has been used to adapt the Virtex-II 
characterization to a typical five-year Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) space mission. Table 1 shows the 
Direct Ionization (Heavy Ions) SEU rate 
simulation results. The numbers have been 
obtained considering that the Virtex 
XQR2V6000 has 16,395,508 configuration bits. 
Table 2 shows the proton-induced SEU rate 
calculation, SEUs produced by nuclear recoils. 
After applying CREME96 to the Virtex-II SEU 
characterization on a real space orbit, we have 
found that we must foreseen 6.394 
SEU/device/day, see Table 3. 
 
Table 4. SEU rate of XQR2V6000, from data 
based on heavy ions irradiations at TAM facility 
 
SEEs/bit/sec /bit/day /device/day 
1.933·10-12 3.169·10-5 2.739 
 
Table 5. SEU rate of XQR2V6000, from data 
based on proton irradiations at UCD facility 
 
SEEs/bit/sec /bit/day /device/day 
2.676·10-12 4.388·10-5 3.791 
 
Table 6. Total SEU rates with Heavy Ions and 
Protons using TAM and UCD data 
 
SEEs/bit/sec /bit/day /device/day 
4.6·10-12 3.9·10-7 6.394 
 
 In order to get the minimum scrubbing rate, 
Xilinx recommends scrubbing at least at a rate 
ten times higher than the SEU rate. For the 
proposed orbit, the maximum scrubbing cycle 
will be 24 hours divided by 63.94 (ten times the 
expected SEU rate), that is, 22.52 minutes   
 On the other hand, assuming that a typical 
read access to the Flash memory is done in 50ns 
with a data bus of 8 bits, and that the 
XQR2V6000 has a total number of 16,395,508 
configuration bits, then the time to completely 
reconfigure the device will be 0.1025 seconds. 
In order for the processor to be able to access 
the Flash memory without excessive wait states, 
we do not advise to use it for reconfiguration 
more than the ten percent (10%) of the time. 
Therefore, we do not recommend a faster 
scrubbing cycle than 1.025 seconds. 
 
Table 7. Maximum and minimum scrubbing 
cycles 
 
Maximum Scrubbing cycle 22.52 minutes 
Minimum Scrubbing cycle 1.025 seconds 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a novel approach based on the 
XTMR tool and the use of self-reconfiguration is 
proposed to develop radiation hardened SoCs 
based on Xilinx FPGAs. These two techniques 
are combined together to enable a reliable 
operation of a FPGA-based SoCs in space 
applications. A full on-board computer could be 
implemented on a single FPGA device, 
significantly reducing cost, space and power 
requirements. The architecture proposed to 
implement these systems has been described, as 
well as the details of the peripheral in charge of 
the self-reconfiguration required to mitigate 
SEUs in the FPGA configuration memory 
 Although the main purpose of the 
architecture is to provide a reliable operation, 
there is an interesting side-effect of self-
reconfiguration. Reconfiguration enables  
hardware updates, thus permitting many 
different problems such as design errors, 
modified algorithms or compatibility issues to be 
remotely solved. 
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